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Abstract 
Anecdotes abound in the Danish public debate about well-educated immigrants that are in jobs 
they are formally overqualified for. Using a 1995-2002 panel data set based on Danish registers, 
this study attempts to find out how large a problem immigrant overeducation is in the context of 
the Danish labor market. More specifically, three questions are posed: First, to what extent are 
immigrants overeducated and are they more likely to be so than native Danes? Second, why are 
some immigrants more likely to become overeducated than others? And finally, what are the 
consequences of overeducation for individual wages? We find that among wage earners with at 
least a vocational education or higher, 25% of male non-Western immigrants are overeducated. 
The same applies for 15% of native Danes. Particularly immigrants with a foreign-acquired 
education risk becoming overeducated – here the share is 30% among those with a vocational 
education or higher. We find that Danish labor market experience is extremely important in 
reducing the likelihood of becoming overeducated. Years spent in the country without 
accumulating labor market experience do not improve an individual’s chances of an appropriate 
job-to-education match. In terms of earnings consequences, the study concludes that years of 
overeducation do increase wages for immigrants, but much less so than years of adequate 
education. This is also true for native Danes, but the relative penalty for overeducation is much 
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Anecdotes abound in the Danish public debate about well-educated immigrants who cannot seem 
to obtain jobs that match their formal qualifications. An individual, who has a job that he is 
formally overqualified for, is said to be overeducated. That is, he has more education than is 
strictly required for his position. Whether or not this is a problem depends on the underlying 
reason for this occupation-to-education mismatch, whether it is a temporary or permanent 
phenomenon experienced by the individual, and whether it is a structural feature of the labor 
market as a whole. Concern arises when overeducation leads to reduced job satisfaction, which 
in turn may lower worker productivity and thereby also wages. Furthermore, being overeducated 
for a longer period of time may lower the labor market value of an individual’s formal qualifica-
tions if these skills become outdated. Overeducation can have macroeconomic implications as 
well. The skills of an overeducated worker are underutilized and therefore overeducation can be 
thought of as a form of skill-related underemployment. Hence, overeducation can be costly for 
the economy at large because human capital resources are allocated in an inefficient manner. 
Consequently, widespread and persistent overeducation can lead to lower overall productivity 
and economic growth.  
 
Against this background, it is relevant to ask how large a problem immigrant overeducation is in 
the context of the Danish labor market. More specifically, three questions are addressed:  
(1)  To what extent are immigrants overeducated?  
(2)  Why are some immigrants more likely to become overeducated than others? 
(3)  What are the consequences of overeducation for individual wages?
1  
 
This study fills a gap in the existing literature by examining the phenomenon of immigrant 
overeducation for the case of Denmark. Most European studies on overeducation – concerning 
both immigrants and natives – consider the cases of Germany, the Netherlands, Portugal, Spain, 
Sweden and the United Kingdom (see e.g. Büchel et al. 2003 for a recent overview).
2 In terms of 
methodology, this study builds on the existing literature, using panel data from administrative 
registers and applying econometric methods to address the questions posed above. This study 
distinguishes itself by proposing an alternative measure of overeducation and by having access to 
a large register-based data set. 
 
                                              
1 In Denmark assimilation of immigrants in the labour market is typically evaluated in relation to employment rates 
because high effective minimum wages make it difficult for low-skilled workers (and thereby certain groups of 
immigrants) to obtain employment. Wage consequences are a “standard“ topic in the overeducation literature, 
however, which makes comparisons with other studies interesting. Moreover, “[o]ne of the most striking empirical 
regularities that has emerged from comparative analyses of the earnings of immigrants and the native born is that the 
partial effect on earnings of a year of schooling is lower for the foreign born than for the native born.” (Chiswick 
and Miller 2005, p.2) Therefore, in this study we investigate what job-to-education mismatches mean for wages and 
whether there are differences between immigrants and native borns.  
2 As far as the author is aware, studies on immigrant overeducation in Denmark limit themselves to two studies 
concerning young second-generation immigrants whose parents came to Denmark from Turkey, Pakistan and the 
former Yugoslavia in the late 1960s and early 1970s (Jakobsen 2004, Schmidt and Jakobsen 2000). 4 
The paper proceeds as follows: The next section provides an overview of the most common 
explanations of overeducation in the literature, while the third section describes the data, 
focusing in particular on educational attainment and occupational status. Section 4 describes the 
empirical methods used to measure overeducation, to identify determinants of overeducation, 
and to assess the earnings consequences of overeducation. Section 5 presents and discusses the 
results of the empirical analysis, and the final section concludes.  
 
2. Literature review 
Two strands of literature form the backdrop for this paper, namely migration and overeducation. 
Within the topic of migration, the present analysis is related to what is known as the assimilation 
literature, which is concerned with the economic and social performance of immigrants in the 
host country. In the present context, interest centers on assessments of how immigrants adapt to 
the host country labor market. Many studies use earnings as the main measure of labor market 
performance and compare immigrant earnings profiles with those of the native born (see e.g. 
Borjas 1985, 1994, 1995, Baker and Benjamin 1994, Longva and Raaum 2003). In this paper, we 
also compare the performance of immigrants and natives, but our main measure of labor market 
performance is job-to-education match.  
 
Several of the more recent labor market assimilation studies mentioned above conclude on a 
rather pessimistic note, pointing out that immigrant and native earnings profiles are rather 
disperse and that assimilation is typically rather slow. Among the explanations given are 
changing compositions of immigrant cohorts (e.g. declining ability, imperfect transferability of 
skills from specific countries of origin) and lower returns to experience for foreign-educated 
immigrants (see e.g. Baker and Benjamin 1994).
3 In this paper, we also distinguish between 
foreign-educated and Danish-educated immigrants, and labor market experience is a key 
explanatory variable in determining which of these two groups of immigrants is more likely to 
experience job-to-education mismatch. 
 
Immigration policy also plays a central role. Borjas (1994), for example, finds that countries that 
actively select more skilled and better educated immigrants through e.g. a points system (e.g. 
Canada and Australia) do indeed attract workers that do well in the labor market. They have 
higher wages and they are less likely to be dependent on public assistance. By contrast, 
immigrants in host countries that have not in the past used such “sorting mechanisms” (e.g. 
Germany and other European countries) do less well. Their wages are lower than their native 
counterparts and there is little evidence of convergence. Denmark has not to any large extent 
actively sought to attract well-educated immigrants. Therefore, there is no reason to expect the 
average immigrant entering Denmark to be particularly well-suited to tackle the challenges of 
entering and performing well in the labor market. 
  
Another relevant measure of labor market performance is occupational outcomes. Green (1999), 
for example, studies the occupational attainment of immigrants in Canada. Somewhat contrary to 
other more recent studies on immigrant performance in Canada, Green (2005) finds very little 
                                              
3 Also considering returns to labour market experience, Chiswick (1978) - one of the very early assimilation studies 
- found that experience acquired in English-speaking countries of origin was rewarded more in the United States 
than experience acquired in non-English-speaking countries of origin. 5 
evidence of immigrants being underrepresented in more skilled occupations relative to native-
born workers with comparable education and experience profiles. Differences in occupational 
attainment in this study are found to be closely related to whether or not the immigrant has been 
assessed under the skills-based point system and related to linguistic fluency. Acknowledging the 
importance of language skills for labor market performance, we include in this present study 
proxies for how well foreign-educated immigrants master the Danish language.  
 
Also concerned with occupational attainment, Mattoo et al. (2005) specifically investigate the 
incidence of unskilled employment among educated immigrants in the United States. They find 
notable differences in occupational attainment of immigrants with comparable educational 
backgrounds but from different source countries. In explaining these findings, they separate 
country-level differences into components related to varying quality of foreign-accumulated 
human capital and selection effects. Borjas (1987) also investigates how immigrant performance 
(measured by earnings) differs by country of origin and finds these differences to be related to 
variations in political and economic conditions in the source country at the time of emigration.  
 
As mentioned above, our main interest is in job-to-education match as the main measure of 
immigrant labor market performance. This is where the literature on overeducation becomes 
relevant. Despite a rather substantial research effort, the phenomenon of overeducation is not yet 
fully explained nor understood. There is no cohesive theory of overeducation. Rather, the 
overeducation literature draws on existing labor market theories to explain why overeducation 
occurs, whether it is a permanent or a temporary phenomenon for the individual and for the labor 
market as a whole, whether it is an equilibrium or disequilibrium feature of the labor market, 
whether it is a result of economic inefficiencies or not, and how it may impact on individual 
earnings. In the following, an overview of the most common explanations will be given (see e.g. 
Linsley (2005), Jakobsen (2004), and Büchel and Mertens (2000) for useful overviews of the 




Human capital theory builds on the notion that education is a form of investment. An individual 
is willing to incur costs in the short run (foregone earnings and education-related expenses) in 
return for higher expected benefits in the long run. It follows that earnings rise with the level of 
human capital (or else the incentive for students to invest in more education would disappear). 
Human capital consists not only of formal education, but also labor market experience and on-
the-job training. Hence, according to this theory, workers that are educationally overqualified 
tend to be less experienced and have less job training. Any “excess” human capital from 
schooling is in fact compensating deficiencies in other substitutable human capital forms 
(Sicherman 1991).
5 In the case of immigrants, these “deficiencies” might relate to lack of host-
                                              
4 The focus of this paper is on overeducation. The literature does not seem to deal very well with explaining 
undereducation, although some empirical studies (e.g. Jakobsen 2004) find that substantial undereducation among 
immigrants exists. See e.g. Büchel and Mertens (2000), Duncan and Hoffman (1981), and Sloane et al. (1999) for 
discussions on undereducation. 
5 If an empirical study includes only some components of human capital (e.g. years of schooling) and takes only 
imperfect account of other forms of human capital such as experience, on-the-job training, and language skills, the 
apparent overeducation phenomenon may simply be a result of an omitted variables problem. Similarly, it is obvious 
that educational requirements are not the only requirements for a job and so by using this as the point of reference, 6 
country labor market experience and inadequate host-country language skills. Therefore, one 
may expect to observe a process of assimilation whereby immigrants initially experience higher 
over education, which is then eroded over time as they gain host-country-specific human capital 
(language, knowledge about the functioning of the labor market, etc.).  
 
There may also be a quality dimension, in the sense that apparent overeducation is in fact 
compensating for a lower quality of immigrants’ formal education obtained in their home 
country. Following this line of thought, one might expect a higher incidence of overeducation 
among immigrants who have obtained their formal education in countries that are characterized 
by lower quality of education. The study by Mattoo et al. 2005, for example, focuses on whether 
the incidence of overeducation differs with country of origin, and if so, how much of such 
differences can be explained by differences in the quality of education in these countries. In their 
empirical analysis, Mattoo et al. 2005 use two variables as indicators of educational quality: the 
level of tertiary education expenditure per student and whether or not English is spoken in the 
country. Borjas (1987) also discusses “quality” of immigrants in a self-selection framework. 
 
The human capital model sees overeducation as a temporary disequilibrium phenomenon. 
Overeducation is believed to occur when there is an increase in the overall educational level of 
workers (without a corresponding increase in qualification requirements on the demand side of 
the labor market), causing the relative wage of high-skilled workers to fall. Employers substitute 
away from low-skilled to high-skilled workers as they face a cheaper supply of educated labor, 
and so well-educated workers end up taking positions that were previously occupied – more 
appropriately – by low-skilled workers (Linsley 2005). In the human capital model, wages are 
determined by the worker’s educational attainment, experience and training. Hence, in its 
simplest form, human capital theory predicts positive returns to overeducation.   
 
Career mobility theory, a variation of human capital theory, sees overeducation as a temporary 
phenomenon experienced by new entrants to the labor market. In the present context, first-
generation immigrants may be viewed as new entrants to the host-country labor market. Such 
individuals willingly and consciously accept positions for which they are formally overeducated, 
while they accumulate experience and occupation-specific training enabling them to advance to 
“higher level positions in which they can make full use of their qualifications” (Linsley 2005 p. 
4). As such, this view is simply an extension of the investment concept presented above. A new 
labor market entrant optimizes by choosing a job for which he is overeducated in order to 
improve his future labor market prospects. Clearly, the validity of the career mobility theory 
would require that overeducated workers do in fact realize a change to a better matching job 
within a reasonable period of time.
6 Referring to evidence from the existing literature, however, 
Büchel and Mertens (2000, p. 3) argue that “substantial parts of the overeducated workforce fail 
to realize a change to jobs with a better match within a longer period of several years.” 
According to these authors, careers seem to follow the path they started from, with no evidence 
                                                                                                                                                  
one may be underestimating the true skill requirements level for “overeducated” workers and overestimating 
requirements for “undereducated” workers (Korpi and Tåhlin 2006).  
6 A core statement of the career mobility theory is that “part of the returns to education is in the form of higher 
probabilities of occupational upgrading, within or across firms.” Consequently, “individuals may choose an entry 
level in which the direct returns to schooling are lower than those in other feasible entry levels if the effect of 
schooling on the probability of promotion is higher in this firm.” Sicherman and Galor (1990, pp. 169 & 177). 7 
of extraordinary career moves for the overeducated w o r k e r s .  T h i s  i s  o f  c o u r s e  a n  em p i r i c a l  
question.  
 
While human capital theory and career mobility theory offer primarily supply side explanations 
of overeducation, job competition theory focuses on the demand side. Firms compete for high 
productivity workers and workers in the applicants’ queue are ranked by their potential training 
costs for the firm. Formal education and on-the-job training are assumed to be complements, and 
therefore training costs are lower for individuals with more education. Applicants are ranked by 
education level and the firm matches well-educated persons to high paying jobs (Linsley 2005 
and Thurow 1975). As in human capital theory, overeducation occurs when there is an increase 
in the overall educational level of workers (but without a corresponding increase in requirements 
on the demand side). The distribution of workers in the labor queue shifts, forcing low-skilled 
workers to be “‘bumped down’ into lower wage jobs or ‘crowded out’ of the labor market into 
unemployment” (Linsley 2005 p.5). According to job competition theory, this situation forces 
high-skilled workers to accept jobs lower in the job queue. In other words, overeducation is not 
voluntary nor part of a conscious, optimizing decision made by individuals like the career 
mobility theory asserts. Earnings in this model are determined by the job characteristics and not 
the individual’s level of education or underlying productivity. Hence in a situation of excess 
supply of highly skilled workers, they will face lower returns on their educational investment. In 
order to defend their position in the labor queue it is rational for individuals to continue to invest 
in education despite lower returns. According to job competition theory overeducation is a 
persistent phenomenon that creates “suboptimal investments in education, allocative 
inefficiencies, and increased income inequalities” (Linsley 2005 p. 6). 
 
The  assignment approach considers both demand and supply side factors in analyzing 
overeducation (Sattinger 1993). The underlying assumption is that worker productivity is 
positively related to education, but that “not all similarly educated workers are equally 
productive in all jobs. Indeed, workers have a comparative advantage in specific jobs. The 
problem of overeducation arises when workers are not allocated to jobs in which they have a 
comparative advantage.” (Linsley 2005 p. 6). Just like the job competition approach, 
overeducation in the assignment model is also viewed as a form of allocative inefficiency 
whereby skills are underutilized. Consequently, overeducation persists until a more efficient 
match between individuals and specific jobs is achieved.  
 
Theories of labor market discrimination are also used to explain overeducation and 
consequential earnings differentials among immigrants and natives.
7 One type of discrimination 
is termed statistical discrimination.
8 Employers have limited information on the skills and 
productivity levels of job applicants and therefore, when hiring and placing workers, they let 
simple observable characteristics such as ethnicity and gender affect the decision, based on the 
notion that such characteristics are correlated with performance. “The employer’s assessment of 
a worker’s skills depends on his/her perception of the average qualifications in the group to 
                                              
7 Discrimination in the labour market can be defined as a situation in which workers who are equally productive in a 
physical or material sense are treated unequally in a way that is related to an observable characteristic such as race, 
ethnicity or gender (Altonji and Blank 1999). “Unequal” in this context means that workers receive different wages 
or face different demands for their labour services at a given wage (Jakobsen 2004). 
8 For discussions on other forms of discrimination see e.g. Becker (1971) and Altonji and Blank (1999). 8 
which the worker belongs and his perception of the reliability of the indicator for the members of 
the concerned group.” (Jakobsen 2004 p. 4, see also Cain 1986). If immigrants find it more 
difficult to acquire any job at all (due to discrimination), they are more likely to accept a job that 
does not match their qualifications. Consequently, one might expect a higher share of immigrants 
to be overeducated compared to natives if discrimination is present. 
 
One must of course be careful in determining what effects are related to discrimination per se. 
Employers cannot, for example, have perfect knowledge about the content or quality of a given 
education obtained in a foreign country. Faced with a choice between imperfect knowledge about 
the skills of an individual educated abroad and perfect (or at least less imperfect) knowledge 
about the (average) quality of the skills of an individual educated in Denmark, it is feasible that 
an employer would make what he perceives to be a “safe” choice by employing workers with a 
Danish education. This may not be due directly to discrimination, but rather to problems of 
imperfect information. Indeed, the immigrant literature stresses the importance of sources of 
human capital. “Skills generated through education or work experience in the source country 
cannot directly be transferred to the host country, resulting in apparently well-qualified 
immigrants holding low-paying jobs.” (Ferrer et al. 2006, p.380-1). Credential problems and 
mismatches in technological requirements can mean that education and experience obtained in 
most other countries are not as productive in Denmark as education and experience acquired in 
Denmark (see also Friedberg 2000, Duleep and Regets 1997, and Green 1995 for studies about 
transferability of credentials). This suggests that one should separate education and experience 
obtained abroad from education and experience obtained in Denmark in the empirical analysis. 
Moreover, an immigrant having completed a Danish formal education reveals important 
information about his Danish language skills.
9 This may explain why immigrants with a foreign 
education tend to have lower employment and labor market participation rates compared to 
immigrants who have taken their education in Denmark. Whether immigrants with a foreign 
education also tend to have a higher probability of being overeducated is an empirical question, 
to which we will return below. 
 
Human capital theory rests on the notion that education enhances the productivity of an 
individual. Alternatively, it may be that education simply reveals – or signals – the inherent 
productivity of an individual (Spence 1973). Signalling in the labor market occurs because an 
employer can never be completely sure of an applicant’s true productivity, which may even 
remain unclear long after an employee is hired. An employer can, however, observe certain 
indicators that firms have experienced (or otherwise believe) to be correlated with productivity. 
Such indicators include age, gender, ethnicity, experience, education, and other personal 
characteristics (Ehrenberg and Smith 1994). According to the job signaling model, the level of 
education can be used as a screening device, which employers use initially to sort job applicants. 
The source of education (country, university, etc.) can also be used as a screening mechanism. 
Furthermore, in countries where higher education is publicly financed (like in Denmark), it may 
be rational for (relatively) low-ability individuals to attend university to obtain a degree 
                                              
9 Ferrer et al. (2006) have detailed information on literacy skills of both immigrants and native Canadian and find 
that literacy skills have a significant impact on earnings. Immigrants do not receive lower returns to literacy skills 
than do otherwise equivalent native-born workers. Controlling for literacy does not, however, affect the relative 
patterns of returns to foreign and Canadian-acquired labour market experience. The authors conclude that lower 
returns to foreign experience still play an important role in explaining immigrant-native earnings differentials.  9 
(notwithstanding its poor quality) in order to be able to send a signal to potential employers. 
Such individuals may end up being overeducated, but this could be better (in terms of earnings, 
for example) than being adequately matched with a lower level of education. Such a strategy is 
possible because society in this case – not the individual – bears the cost of providing the signal 
(Chevalier 2003).  
 
Related to this discussion is the process of self-selection.
10 Overeducated workers may be 
characterized by below-average ability compared with adequately matched workers with the 
same level of education.
11 As Büchel and Mertens (2000) argue, why should the overeducated, 
whose career path until now has revealed that they are not able to get a job that matches their 
formal qualifications, perform differently in the future? According to this view, overeducation 
should be seen as an indicator of underachievement. If this is the case, there is reason to be 
concerned about the future career prospects of overeducated workers. Sloane et al. (1999), for 
example, do not find evidence that the matches of overeducated workers improve with a change 
of employer. Rather, overeducated workers seem more prone to dismissal and have more 
unemployment spells. This view does not, however, take account of other factors such as 
discrimination, which may (as discussed above) force immigrants to take jobs for which they are 
overqualified simply to get a job at all. 
 
Summing up, the existing literature presents a patchwork of possible explanations for 
overeducation – some complementary, others contradictory. In the following, we will conduct an 
empirical investigation of the phenomenon as it plays itself out in the context of the Danish labor 
market.  
 
3. Data description  
The empirical analysis uses two large data sets originating from administrative registers. The 
first data set contains information on the entire population of immigrants living in Denmark. The 
second data set consists of a 10% sample of the native Danish population. Young individuals are 
added to the sample each year, ensuring that the sample is representative each year. Both data 
sets used in this study cover the period 1995-2002. We have chosen to restrict the two data sets 
as follows: We examine only first-generation, non-Western immigrants because this is the group 
of foreigners that have the greatest difficulties in terms of labor market integration. Moreover, 
most second-generation immigrants in Denmark are still fairly young and therefore have not yet 
                                              
10 Concerning immigrants, self-selection may also occur in the migration decision itself. Given the costs (economic 
and social) involved in migrating, it may be that the abilities of migrants from different source countries differ 
because they self-select from “different sections of the skill distribution of their home countries.” (Mattoo et al. p.2) 
With reference to the U.S. labour market, Mattoo et al. (2005) argue that “[f]or higher GDP countries, the 
opportunity cost of migrating is high, and so only individuals with high income potential would emigrate to and 
remain in the United States.” […] ”For countries with per capita GDP substantially lower than that of the United 
States, the relative distribution of income is irrelevant and it can be assumed that both low and high ability 
individuals would wish to migrate. But it is conceivable that in some of the poorest countries only the more capable 
have the means to migrate.” (Mattoo et al. 2005, p.16)  
11 Conversely, undereducated workers are taken to exert above-average abilities and to be more successful in their 
career, up to the point of time when their qualification mismatch was observed, than what can be expected from their 
(relatively low) educational attainments. As Büchel and Mertens (2000) argue, why should they not continue to be 
extraordinarily successful in their future career? 10 
accumulated much labor market experience. Our sample is restricted to males because the 
employment and earnings situations for female immigrants are considerably different from those 
of male immigrants. The age group considered consists of individuals aged 30-57. The lower age 
limit is set to take account of the rather high age at which Danish students on average finish their 
post-secondary school education compared to students in other countries. The upper age limit is 
set to avoid selection problems related to early retirement. Individuals who are undertaking full-
time education and individuals for whom information about their highest attained education is 
not available are excluded. For roughly one third of the immigrants in the sample, we do not 
have information about their highest attained level of education, either because they do not have 
a Danish education or because they have not responded to surveys conducted by Statistics 
Denmark in 1999 and 2003 about their foreign-acquired education. Despite efforts by Statistics 
Denmark to impute values for the levels of education for these individuals, we have chosen not 
to include them in our analysis.
12 Incidentally, it must be stressed that we have no way of 
ascertaining the quality of the survey-based information on immigrants’ foreign-acquired 
education. We restrict our analysis to include only wage-earners who have worked what 
corresponds to at least two months full-time in a given year
13 and we exclude wage-earners who 
are employed in the military or as legislators, senior officials and managers
14. The reason for the 
former restriction is that we do not want the results to be affected by short-term employment 
spells such as summer-time jobs, which may be characterized by higher degrees of overeducation 
than more permanent jobs. The reason for the latter restriction is that these two occupational 
groups are so heterogeneous that it does not make sense to attempt to define which levels of 
educations are appropriate for these jobs. Appendix Tables A1 and A2 detail the number of 
observations lost in each step of this sample selection process. In the forthcoming text, we will 
use the term “immigrants“ to refer to this particular sample and so the reader must bear in mind 
its restrictions, particularly because the final sample cannot be taken as being representative of 
the immigrant population. In the econometric estimations, the samples are restricted even further 
by considering only individuals who have either a vocational education or a short, medium, or 
long higher education (the reason for this is discussed in more detail in section 5.2). Appendix 
Table A3 shows mean values and standard deviations of the sample used in the econometric 
estimations, whilst Appendix Table 4 compares – for selected variables – the samples resulting 
from the first selection process (shown in Appendix Tables A1 and A2 and used in the 
descriptive Tables 1-15 below), the sample used in the econometric estimations (results of which 
are reported in Tables 16-17), and a comparison sample consisting of male 30-57 year-old first-
generation immigrants from non-Western countries. 
 
                                              
12 The original survey conducted in 1999 covered approximately 160,000 individuals. The overall response rate was 
49.7%, but it varied quite substantially from group to group. It was especially low among Turks (30.1%) and 
Somalis (31.5%), but also fairly low for Moroccans (38.2%), Lebanese (35.1%) and Pakistanis (38.8%). (Mørkeberg 
2000). It is therefore important to stress that the sample used in this study is not a representative sample of male 
immigrants in Denmark. For immigrants who did not respond to the survey (and who do not have a Danish 
education), information about their education has been imputed by Statistics Denmark based on their country of 
origin, age at migration, current age and sex. Because of serious concerns about the quality of this imputation, 
however, we have chosen to delete these individuals from the analysis.  
13 Some individuals have unreliable registered wages. These are excluded from the sample.  
14 These are DISCO (the Danish equivalent to the International Standard Classification of Occupations, ISCO) codes 
0 and 1. 11 
Key variables used in this study include labor market participation status, occupational category, 
hourly wages, Danish labor market experience, highest attained level of education
15, source of 
education (Denmark or home country), age, marital status, number of children, and for 
immigrants the country of origin, year of entry, and initial placement level on Danish language 
courses. Danish language courses are offered to all immigrants with insufficient Danish skills. 
Immigrants under the 1999 Integration Act who receive so-called introductory benefits are 
required to participate. The language courses are organized as a three-track study programmed. 
Placement on the three tracks is based on an individual’s expected prerequisites for learning the 
Danish language. The first track is for individuals who have not learned to read and write their 
mother tongue, or for individuals who have not learned to read and write the Latin alphabet. The 
second track is for individuals with no more than a short higher education from their home-
country, whilst the third track is for individuals who have a medium-long or long higher 
education from their home country. The variable shows the track placement of an individual at 
the start of his Danish language training.  
 
3.1. Educational attainment and occupational status 
We will begin by considering the patterns of educational attainment of immigrants and compare 
them with that of native Danes. At the aggregate level, Table 1 shows that the distribution of 
educational attainment among immigrants in this particular sample (see discussion on sample 
selection criteria in the previous section) does not differ substantially from that of Danes except 
for one particular category. The share of Danes with a vocational education is almost 14 
percentage points higher (47.5%) than that of immigrants (33.9%). The immigrant sample has 
somewhat larger shares of individuals both at the lower end of the scale (primary or secondary 
education) and at the higher end (short, medium or long higher education) compared to the 
Danish sample. There are of course large differences between different ethnic groups. Around 
60% of Turkish immigrants, for example, have no more than primary schooling. Immigrants 
from Iran and Iraq, by contrast, are well-educated: 64% and 53%, respectively, have a higher 
education (short, medium or long), compared with just 26% for native Danes. Table 2 shows that 
there are large differences in educational attainment depending on whether immigrants have 
taken their education in their home country or in Denmark. Two points are worth mentioning. 
First, among immigrants with foreign-acquired education, a higher share (42%) has no more than 
either primary or secondary schooling compared with immigrants with a Danish education 
(25%). Second, among immigrants with a Danish education, a substantially higher share has a 
medium-long or long higher education (32%) compared with immigrants with a foreign degree 
(18%). 
 
With this educational background in mind, let us now turn to the next question of how these 
immigrants fare in the Danish labor market. Table 3 reveals that despite the overall level of 
education of immigrants in this sample, a larger share of immigrants are employed in jobs that 
require only elementary qualifications (22%) compared to Danes (14%). Digging into the ethnic 
differences, we find that 32% of Turkish immigrants are employed in jobs that require no more 
than elementary qualifications. This is not surprising, of course, given their low levels of 
education. It is somewhat more surprising that 41% of Iranian immigrants are in jobs that require 
                                              
15 The highest attained level of education is converted into effective years of schooling. Each degree/diploma or 
level of education is measured as the minimum years of schooling necessary to obtain that degree/diploma. 12 
elementary or low levels of qualifications, given their generally high levels of education. 
Considering the difference between immigrants who have attained their degree in their home 
country with those who have attained it in Denmark, Table 4 shows that 42% of immigrants with 
a Danish education are employed in jobs requiring high or medium level qualifications, whilst 
the share is 13% for those educated in their home country (and 37% for ethnic Danes). 
 
Tables 5-8 cross-tabulate educational attainment and job skill level to provide a sense of the 
degree of job-to-education mismatch among native Danes, immigrants in general, immigrants 
with a Danish education, and immigrants with a foreign-acquired education, respectively. Table 
6, for example, shows that among immigrants with a long higher education, 21% are employed 
in jobs requiring just elementary or a low level of qualifications. Among Danes with a long 
higher education (Table 5) only 4% are employed in such jobs. There are, however, large 
differences between the two groups of immigrants. While 44% of immigrants with a foreign-
acquired long higher education are employed in jobs requiring just elementary or a low level of 
qualifications, only 4% of immigrants with a Danish long higher education are in such a 
situation. Similar patterns are found for individuals with short and medium-length higher 
educations with the most striking differences again being between native Danes and immigrants 
with foreign credentials. The job-to-education match of immigrants with a Danish education 
tends to be more similar to that of native Danes. Calculating the column percentages (not shown 
in the tables), it is worth noting that among individuals employed in jobs that require only 
elementary qualifications, 22% of immigrants with foreign credentials have a higher level of 
education (short, medium or long). To compare, such a mismatch applies for only 3% of native 
Danes and 6% of immigrants with a Danish education employed in elementary jobs.  
 
4. Empirical methods 
4.1. Measuring overeducation  
Measuring overeducation is by no means a straightforward exercise.
16 Indeed, this measurement 
issue is one of the most controversial aspects of the overeducation literature. Three different 
techniques to measure overeducation are typically used: job analysis (JA), realized matches 
(RM), and worker self-assessment (WA) (see e.g. Linsley 2005, Verhaest and Omey 2004, Battu 
and Sloane 2002). The JA approach is based on the assessment by professional job analysts of 
the education and training requirements for different occupations and compares this with the 
actual educational attainment of individual workers. In principle, this is an appealing approach 
because of its “explicit goal of objectivity, clear definitions and detailed measurement 
instructions”, yet in practice it runs into several problems (Hartog 2000 p.132). In particular, 
occupational categories in conventional data sets are typically quite broad, resulting in a great 
deal of heterogeneity in job requirements within the same occupational title.  
 
                                              
16 Some researchers make a point of distinguishing between educational mismatch and skill mismatch. These two 
concepts are of course related, yet Allen and de Weert (2005) stress that educational mismatch is neither a necessary 
nor a sufficient condition for skill mismatch. Based on a survey performed in Spain, Germany, the Netherlands, UK 
and Japan, they find that the wage effects of educational mismatches are much stronger and more consistent across 
countries than the effects of skill mismatches. 13 
The Danish occupation-to-qualifications mapping based on what amounts to a JA approach maps 
all major occupational groups (DISCO codes at the one-digit level) to just four different 
qualification requirement levels.
17 Similar mappings for other countries are somewhat richer in 
detail. For the Netherlands, for example, van der Meer (2002) describes a mapping into seven 
different qualification levels. Moreover, there are difficulties in translating job requirements into 
years of schooling (a key variable in the econometric analysis below) because not all jobs require 
very much formal schooling, but may be characterized by more on-the-job training. Also, 
different educations that are equally appropriate for a given type of job (with a given 
qualification-level requirement) are characterized by very different lengths of schooling 
(measured in years), which makes it difficult to create relevant limits. Finally, such 
classifications are rapidly outdated. In the case of Denmark, this classification makes use of a 
mapping between DISCO-88 and ISCED-76
18 classifications and Statistics Denmark is only now 
in the process of updating this to the DISCO-08 and ISCED-97 classifications. For all these 
reasons, the JA approach is not very attractive for the case of Denmark. 
 
The WA approach uses surveys to ask workers how much education or schooling is required to 
perform (or obtain) their particular job. These responses are then used to compare the level of 
education workers believe is required to perform (or obtain) their job with their actual education 
level. On the positive side, this method is up-to-date and specific to each individual’s job. On the 
negative side, this is a highly subjective measure, and it is commonly known that individuals 
have a tendency to inflate reported educational requirements. They may also simply be restating 
actual hiring practices or at least what they believe to be so. Furthermore, there may be 
systematic biases in how job requirements are assessed across genders and other groupings.
19 In 
any case, subjective survey-based information on job-to-education mismatch in an individual’s 




The RM approach derives the “adequate” education level as the mean or median (and sometimes 
the modal value) of the observed distribution of actual educational attainment (measured in years 
of schooling) in each occupational category. As such, it measures the outcome of the actual 
matching process (the interplay between labor demand and supply) as determined by current 
hiring standards and labor market conditions. For this reason the RM measure must be 
interpreted differently from the WA and the JA measures.
21 An individual is then taken to be 
overeducated if his actual level of schooling is greater than the norm, or reference, level of 
education in his occupational category (with undereducation similarly defined). Several authors 
                                              
17 The four levels of qualification requirements are those used in Tables 3-8, i.e. elementary, low, medium and high.  
18 ISCED: International Standard Classification of Education. 
19 Based on survey information, Chevalier (2003) and Chevalier and Lindley (2006) distinguish between apparent 
overeducation and genuine overeducation, by asking respondents to comment on their satisfaction with the match 
between their education and their job. They assume that formally overeducated employees are only apparently 
overeducated if they are satisfied with this match, whilst formally overeducated employees are genuinely 
overeducated if they are dissatisfied with the match. 
20 Analysing the case of Sweden, Böhlmark (2003) finds that overeducation is associated with lower job satisfaction. 
Also, he finds that workers who improve their education-to-job match over time become more satisfied with their 
jobs. 
21 Verhaest and Omey (2004) argue that the RM approach is an appropriate estimate of the privately optimal level of 
education only if labour markets are flexible and efficient. Otherwise, the RM measure may systematically either 
over- or underestimate the complexity level of jobs. 14 
choose to operate with a band around the mean or median level of education by defining an 
individual as overeducated (undereducated) if his educational attainment is more than one 
standard deviation above (below) the mean or median (e.g. Verdugo and Verdugo 1989, Lindley 
and Lenton 2006). A clear disadvantage of this approach is that the band imposes symmetry on 
the matching distribution, which is quite a strong assumption.  
 
Each of the three approaches described above has its shortcomings and the choice is often 
dictated by data availability (see e.g. Hartog 2000 for a discussion). Clearly, the method of 
measurement will influence the results and their interpretation (see e.g. Rubb 2003a; Verhaest 
and Omey 2004).
22 Therefore, good understanding of the pros and cons of the measure applied is 
necessary when interpreting the empirical results and drawing conclusions. 
  
For the current study, a modified version of the RM approach is adopted. The RM approach is 
used to define an individual as being “adequately” matched if he has the “typical” level of 
education defined as a band around the median value of education observed in his current 
occupational category. To avoid the assumption of symmetry, we suggest using the following 
distribution rule, which distributes twice the standard deviation in a way that reflects the 
potential asymmetry of the distribution.
23  
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To avoid having too few observations in some occupations, we use the DISCO-88 categorization 
at the 2-digit level for occupations with at least 10 observations. This gives us 30 occupational 
categories.
24 Table 9 details the median years of education for each occupation as well as the 
lower and upper limits defining under- and overeducation, respectively. These limits are 
calculated for native Danish wage-earners who have worked for what corresponds to at least two 
                                              
22 Groot and Maassen van den Brink (2000) find that while the choice of definition does affect the incidence of 
overeducation (RM approaches yield the lowest estimates, while WA approaches yield the highest estimates), there 
is not much effect on the estimates of wage earning differentials. Rubb (2003a), by contrast, suggests that the 
definition of required education may in fact affect the estimates of the returns from overeducation. 
23 Symmetric limits have also been calculated and the two approaches do result in different limits. 
24 For some individuals, information about occupation is only provided at the 1-digit DISCO-88 level, and hence 
over- and undereducated limits are calculated separately for these “not elsewhere classified” categories. 15 
months full-time work in a given year.
25 Hence in this context an individual is said to be 
overeducated if he possesses more education than the “Danish norm” in his occupation category.  
 
Table 9 shows that there is large variation in how broad and narrow the limits defining adequate 
education are in the various occupation categories. Among individuals employed as ‘Stationary 
plant and related operators’ (DISCO 81), for example, adequate education is anywhere between 
8.5 and 14.1 years of schooling, respectively, whereas individuals employed as ‘Models, 
salespersons and demonstrators’ are adequately educated if they have precisely 13 years of 
schooling. Also, the categories vary according to how asymmetric the definition of adequate 
education is relative to the median. Among “Agricultural, fishery and related workers” (DISCO 
92), for example, the median is closer to the lower limit, while for “Life science and health 
associate professionals” (DISCO 32) the median is closer to the upper level. In particular, note 
that individuals with less than 13.0 years of education (i.e. individuals with no more than either 
primary or secondary schooling) cannot, by this definition, be overeducated. All the upper limits 
defining adequate education are at least 13.0 years. 
 
4.2. Determinants of overeducation 
After having presented the method used to determine the incidence of overeducation (results of 
which are presented and discussed in Section 5.1 below), this section describes the econometric 
method used to identify important determinants of overeducation. As the review in Section 2 
showed, there are a number of possible explanations as to why overeducation occurs, for which 
types of workers and under which particular circumstances. While there are no clear-cut 
conclusions, we can formulate some expectations about which factors are important in 
determining an individual’s risk or probability of being overeducated. These are labor market 
experience, age, ethnicity, language skills, source of education
26 and years since migration. Yet, 
the review also left open the possibility that part of the remaining reason for being overeducated 
may well simply be caused by individual heterogeneity.
27 Within a group of workers with the 
same education, some are more skilled (in aspects that are not necessarily captured by formal 
education), more motivated and more able than others. Examples of relevant, but for the 
researcher unobservable, personal characteristics could be health, leadership skills, management 
skills, ability to work in teams, creativity, and IT-skills. 
 
                                              
25 We have chosen to base the limits on native Danes so as not to let the large differences between immigrants with a 
Danish and a foreign education interfere with the overall picture.  
26 In the available data, we can observe whether an immigrant has obtained his degree in his home country or in 
Denmark. What we cannot observe is the quality or applicability/relevance of a foreign degree in the Danish labour 
market. This may affect the probability of becoming overeducated, but we lack the information necessary to disclose 
such effects. 
27 Böhlmark (2003) finds evidence in the Swedish labour market that there is a great deal of unobserved 
heterogeneity among the overeducated. Examining transitions over time, he finds that more than 50% of workers 
found to be overeducated at the beginning of the study period are still poorly matched 10 years later (based on data 
for individuals observed in 1981 and 1991 and then for individuals observed in 1991 and 2000). Yet, the remaining 
half leaves overeducation and manages to close the initial wage-gap relative to adequately matched workers with the 
same level of education. These results serve to underline the unobserved heterogeneity among the group of 
overeducated workers. 16 
Individual characteristics such as these may well influence the probability of a worker accepting 
a job for which he is formally overeducated as measured by his level of education. It is not clear, 
however, which way such an effect goes. On the one hand, overeducated individuals may be the 
most motivated and eager to work (among individuals who find it difficult to obtain a job either 
generally or specifically during a period where the labor market is depressed) and thereby take 
the chance to demonstrate their skills and qualifications on-the-job (e.g. motivated by the line of 
thought presented by the career mobility theory in Section 2). On the other hand, the 
overeducated may be so precisely because they have (partly unobserved) individual 
characteristics that make them unable to obtain a job that matches their formal qualifications.  
 
There are several possible strategies to account for such unobserved individual heterogeneity. A 
few authors in the overeducation literature attempt to find proxies for otherwise unobserved 
individual heterogeneity. Korpi and Tåhlin (2006), for example, include survey-based 
information on health and verbal ability.
28 Chevalier (2003) and Chevalier and Lindley (2006) 
also attempt to find proxies for unobserved ability differences. For this present study we do not 
have survey information from which to obtain such proxies. Yet, the panel aspect of our data set, 
where we are able to follow the same individuals over a period of time, allows us to take account 
of this inherent omitted variables problem and deal with unobserved individual heterogeneity so 
as to avoid obtaining biased estimates.  
 
To briefly present the issue at hand, consider a linear model, with the unobserved individual 
effect, ci, entering additively: 
 
yit = xitβ + ci + uit, t= 1,2,…,T. 
 
In panel data models, the individual effect ci is interpreted as capturing features of an individual 
such as cognitive ability and motivation, etc. that are given and assumed constant over time. 
These models rest on the assumption that the xit variables are strictly exogenous conditional on 
the unobserved effect ci. In other words, once xit and ci have been controlled for, xis has no partial 
effect on yit for s ≠ t (Wooldridge 2002). 
 
E(yit ׀ xi1 , xi2, …, xiT, ci) = E(yit ׀ xit , ci) =  xitβ + ci    for t=1,2,…,T. 
 
A key issue is whether or not ci is uncorrelated with the observed explanatory variables xit, 
t=1,2,…,T. The so-called Random Effects estimator assumes that ci is uncorrelated with xit, 
whereas the so-called Fixed Effects estimator allows ci to be correlated with xit. Allowing 
correlation between ci and xit, the fixed effects approach is more robust than the random effects 
approach. This robustness comes at a price, however. First of all, one cannot include time-
constant factors in xit, because there is no way of distinguishing the effect of time-constant 
observables from the time-constant unobservable ci. Hence, characteristics such as ethnicity and 
initial Danish language training placement cannot be included in xit. Another downside of the 
fixed effects model – and one that is potentially more serious than the previous one – is that 
identification relies on individual variation over time and thereby discards all information 
                                              
28 Inclusion of these variables, nevertheless, leaves all the educational estimates in their analysis completely 
unaffected. Their survey information also includes several measures of on-the-job training, advancement prospects 
and job satisfaction, which they use to try to capture career-based explanations for overeducation. 17 
represented by cross-sectional variation. This is because the random effects approach conducts 
between-person comparisons, while the fixed effects approach considers within-person 
comparisons. Very few individuals in this data set change status from being e.g. adequately 
matched to being overeducated during the observed period of time and therefore we choose to 




To identify key determinants of overeducation, we estimate a set of random effects logit models 
for the probability of being overeducated (the alternative being either adequately educated or 
undereducated). Assuming a normal distribution, N(0,
2
c σ ) for the random effects ci, the model to 
be estimated is: 
 
exp( )
Pr( 1| , ) ( ) , 1,2,...,
1 exp( )
it i
it it i it i
it i
xc










Separate models are estimated for four groups: Immigrants in total, immigrants with a Danish 
education, immigrants with a foreign-acquired education, and finally, for comparison purposes, 
ethnic Danes. As explanatory variables, we consider the effects of age, Danish labor market 
experience
30, initial placement level on Danish language courses, years since migration, ethnicity 
dummies, year dummies, marital status, and number of children. For each of these variables, we 
can make educated guesses (based on the overview provided above) about the effects on the 
probability of being overeducated. It is important to stress that the relationship is not necessarily 
causal, but serves to identify important correlations in the data. 
 
4.3. Earnings consequences of overeducation 
In the third and final step of our empirical analysis, we estimate a set of random effects linear 
regression models to investigate the implications that overeducation has on individual wages. 
Following the existing overeducation literature, we take the Mincer earnings equation (also 
known as the human capital earnings equation) as our starting point. The Mincer equation is 
based on a formal model of investment in human capital (see e.g. Heckman et al. 2003 and Willis 
1986), leading to the following equation, which regresses log earnings (wit) on a constant term, a 
linear term in years of schooling (sit), and linear and quadratic terms in years of labor market 
experience (xit). The individual unobserved effect υi is included in the equation since individuals 




00 1 ln ( , ) it it it s it it it i it wsx s x x α αββυ ε =+ + + + +  
 
                                              
29 Using a fixed-effects approach (excluding age, age
2/100 as well as the time-invariant variables) yields similar 
results for the experience and YSM coefficients presented in Section 5.2 below. 
30 Note that we consider actual  labour market experience in Denmark as opposed to potential  labour market 
experience, which is the most common approach taken in the literature due to lack of data. 18 
The Mincer earnings equation has become a cornerstone of empirical labor economics. It has 
been estimated in various forms for virtually all countries for which cross-section data exist.
31 
The basic model rests upon a number of simplifying assumptions, among which the most 
important are as follows: Education is assumed to last for a given number of years, there is no 
distinction between different types of education, and the decision to be educated is an all-or-




33 proceeds by decomposing the actual years of schooling variable in 
the traditional Mincer equation into three parts (ignoring subscripts for the moment): 
ROU ss s s =+−, where s
R is required schooling (i.e. the level of education required for the job 
the individual has), s
O is over-schooling (i.e. the number of years of schooling the individual 
might have in excess of s
R), and s
U is under-schooling (i.e. the number of years of schooling the 
individual might have less than s
R). The equation reduces to s = s
R for adequately matched 
workers, s = s
R +  s
O for overeducated workers, and s = s
R -  s
U for undereducated workers. 
Given our use of a buffer around the median level of schooling in each occupation category, the 
upper and lower limits, respectively, are used to calculate the number of overeducation-years and 
undereducation-years of each overeducated and undereducated individual, respectively. For 
adequately match individuals, it is their actual years of schooling that is taken as the adequate 
level. Introducing this decomposition into the traditional Mincer equation yields what is 
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In terms of interpreting the coefficients, α1 indicates the return to schooling for adequately 
matched workers. The coefficients α2 and α3 are to be interpreted in conjunction with α1 to obtain 
the total impact of education for mismatched workers. This decomposition has the attractive 
conceptual property that it combines information on attained and required education whilst 
retaining the continuous character of both dimensions.  
 
                                              
31 The popularity of the Mincer equation is due to several desirable features (see Chiswick 1997). First of all, it is 
not an ad hoc specification, but derived from human capital theory. Moreover, it is both sparse in terms of data 
requirements and it is also flexible in the sense that additional explanatory variables can be included as seen 
appropriate for the particular study. Finally, it provides a convenient semi-logarithmic relationship between earnings 
and length of schooling, which makes econometric estimation straightforward. 
32 A word of caution concerning interpretation is necessary. The coefficient of the schooling variable is often 
interpreted as the rate of return from schooling. As Chiswick (1997 p.5) points out, this is only true under specific 
circumstances, namely “if the investment in schooling equals the full-year potential earnings if there were no further 
investment.” This can occur, for example, if there are no direct schooling costs and the foregone earnings equal a 
full year’s earnings. In general, however, the coefficient of schooling simply estimates the average percent increase 
in earnings per year of schooling. This caveat notwithstanding, we will loosely use the term “returns to schooling” in 
this paper. 
33 The original formulation of this specification was proposed by Duncan and Hoffman (1981) and was an ad hoc 
formulation without an explicit theoretical underpinning. It did not refer to the idea of human capital compensation. 
A rationale based on viewing overeducation as part of a human capital investment strategy in the Mincer (1974) 
tradition was provided later by Sicherman and Galor (1990).  19 
The relabeling of the coefficients (from αs to α1, α2 and α3) in the final ORU equation above 
shows that the traditional Mincer equation imposes the following restriction:  123 1: H α αα ==. 
Accepting hypothesis H1 amounts to saying that the return to (an additional year of) schooling is 
the same for all individuals with the same level of schooling, regardless of whether the individual 
is in a job that matches his qualifications or whether he is over- or undereducated. It is his actual 
schooling that matters – not the match. Another hypothesis one can test is: 23 2: 0 H α α == . This 
amounts to saying that “excess” and “deficit” years of schooling (compared to job requirements) 
are neither rewarded nor penalized. It is the education requirements of the job (s
R) alone that 
have an impact on earnings.   
 
Intuition tells us that earnings vary not only with education level and labor market experience but 
also by other factors. For this reason, estimations of the ORU equation often control for a range 
of other variables in addition to the standard human capital variables.
34 The same explanatory 
variables used in the logit models described in the previous section are also used in the wage 
equations.  
 
In empirical implementations of the Mincer (and related) earnings equation, schooling is treated 
as exogenous despite the fact that education is clearly an endogenous choice variable in the 
underlying human capital theory.
35 Recall that the sample population analyzed here includes 
only wage-employed individuals. It is obvious that these individuals may differ systematically in 
their characteristics from the entire population and especially from the sub-populations of e.g. 
self-employed or individuals outside the labor force. In other words, it is not a random sample of 
the population that is employed. Nor can it be assumed that it is a random sample of the 
employed population that is overeducated. Regarding the first selection bias, it might be that it is 
the most able and motivated individuals who succeed in obtaining employment. This self-
selection process may result in an upward bias of the effect of education on wages. In this 
application, we only consider employed persons and therefore we have “jumped over” this first 
selection bias hurdle. Regarding the second selection bias, there are numerous possible sources. 
On the one hand, it might be the less able individuals (among those who are able to get a job to 
begin with) that end up being overeducated and so this will show up as an apparently small 
reward to excess years of education. On the other hand, it may be that if immigrants find it 
difficult to get a job at all (perhaps due to discrimination), they may be willing to accept a job for 
which they are formally overeducated, simply as means of entering the labor market. This may 
also bias the results and lead to potentially erroneous conclusions when comparing returns to 
overeducation for immigrants with that of native Danes.  
 
                                              
34 It is of course important to bear in mind that the coefficients of the primary variables will typically depend on 
which other variables are included in the equation to “hold everything else constant” (Thurow 1983). The key 
identifying assumption in the earnings function is that the observable characteristics included as controls are the only 
reason why the random part of individual earnings potential and schooling are correlated. In other words, this is the 
“selection on observables” assumption, where the regressor of interest (schooling) is assumed to be determined 
independently of potential outcomes after taking account of a set of observable characteristics (Angrist and Krueger 
1999). 
35 “It is worth reiterating that this is no different from the rest of the immigrant earnings literature which rarely if 
ever addresses education endogeneity.” (Ferrer et al. 2006 p. 386). 20 
It would of course be desirable to take account of this selectivity in the present analysis. This is 
not a straightforward task, however, and therefore several authors choose not to address the issue 
at all (see e.g. Chevalier 2003, Chevalier and Lindley 2006 for discussions). The problem lies in 
choosing a suitable instrument, i.e. a variable which affects an individual’s overeducation 
outcome but not his wage. Usually, economic theory guides the choice of instrument, but as the 
overview in Section 2 demonstrates, there is no clearcut view of what leads some individuals to 
be overeducated and not others. A number of studies use family-related variables as instruments 
(e.g. number of children), but these are often found to be weak (see e.g. Harmon et al. 2000 for a 
discussion of instrument choice). The study by Silles and Dolton (2002) is one of the few that 
attempt to take account of the endogeneity of the overeducation variable. They rely on mobility 
between region of education and region of employment as an instrument, but find that 
accounting for selectivity into overeducation produces results that are not significantly different 
from their OLS results. This conclusion may well be drawn because the choice of weak 
instruments leads to imprecise results. Korpi and Tåhlin (2006) also attempt an instrumental 
variables approach to dealing with endogeneity of the education variable, but they too find that 
their instruments are weak: sibship size, place of residence during childhood, economic problems 
in the family of origin, and disruption in the family of origin. Finally, it is important to note that 
choosing an invalid instrument does not only fail to correct, but may even aggravate the selection 
bias. In this analysis we therefore refrain from attempting to estimate the ORU model using 
instrumental variables techniques.  
 
In choosing whether to estimate the ORU equation using a fixed effects or a random effects 
estimator, as discussed in the previous section, the question centers on whether or not one 
believes that the individual heterogeneity captured in υi is correlated with xit or not. In this case, 
υi is unobserved earnings ability, which can of course be correlated with the overeducation 
variable, ethnicity or any of the other explanatory variables. The fixed effects estimator is 
immune to such correlation, but as discussed in the previous section, the fixed effects estimator 
uses only with-person variation. A person who changes his job to a different occupational 




U. But by construction, the sum of these three components 
ROU sss + −  is equal to s (i.e. 
actual schooling) which is constant. Thus, the within-individual variation in  ,
R s  
O s  and 
U s  is 
characterized by perfect multi-collinearity for persons whose education level is constant in the 
estimation period. Consequently, a fixed effects approach would only identify the effect of over-
education from information on individuals who change their level of education within the sample 
period. This is a very unattractive feature for our current study since only very few persons in our 
sample of persons aged 30 and above do that, and those who do are typically out of our sample 
for several years while they are enrolled in education. We therefore choose to estimate the model 
using a random effects approach. 
 21 
5. Results 
5.1. Incidence of overeducation 
Applying the limits defined in Section 4.1 and detailed in Table 9, we find that 16% of the 
immigrants in our sample are overeducated, compared with 11% of native Danes (Table 10).
36 It 
is important to note that these overeducation shares are based on the full samples, i.e. including 
workers who have only primary or secondary schooling. As discussed in Section 4.1, such 
workers cannot – by the definition used here – be overeducated, and so they pull the shares 
down. Below (in Table 13) we calculate overeducation shares based on the sub-sample of 
workers with either vocational or higher education, i.e. for those who can in fact – by the 
definition used here – risk being overeducated. These shares are of course somewhat higher than 
those reported in Table 10 (and Tables 11-12). 
 
Returning to Table 10, we find that there are of course differences related to ethnicity. While 
24% of Iraqi immigrants are overeducated, only 8% of Turkish immigrants are so. Low levels of 
education among Turks mean that many of them cannot, by definition, be overeducated. In fact 
38% are undereducated. Furthermore, the quality of the job-to-education match seems to depend 
on where an immigrant has his education from. Among those with a Danish education, 73% are 
adequately matched compared with 60% of those with foreign-acquired education (Table 11). 
Table 12 shows the share of overeducated immigrants by ethnic origin and source of education. 
With two exceptions (immigrants from Vietnam and Iraq) higher shares of overeducated workers 
are found among immigrants with a foreign-acquired education compared with immigrants with 
a Danish education. The largest differences are observed for immigrants from Iran, Former 
Yugoslavia and Somalia.   
 
As discussed above, individuals with either primary or secondary schooling as their highest 
attained level of education cannot – by the definition used here – be overeducated. Indeed, in 
Table 13, which shows the incidence of overeducation at different levels of education, one sees 
that the shares of overeducated among individuals with primary or secondary schooling are zero. 
If one calculates the shares of overeducated in relation to the sub-sample of individuals with 
either a vocational education or a higher education (short, medium or long) as opposed to 
measuring the shares of overeducated in relation to the full sample (i.e. including those with 
primary or secondary schooling), one finds that the shares of overeducated are somewhat higher: 
15% for native Danes and 25% for immigrants (‘Weighted total’ in Table 13). Once again, there 
                                              
36 In their meta-analysis of studies on overeducation, which covers all three types of measurement approaches (JA, 
WA, RM), Groot and Maassen van den Brink (2000) find that the incidence of overeducation varies from 10% to 
42% and the average is lower in Europe (21.5%) than in the United States (26.3%). For the case of Australia, 
Linsley (2005) finds, using the WA approach, that close to 30% are overeducated. Using a JA approach, Green et al. 
(2005) find that less than 10% of native Australian are overeducated, whilst the figures are markedly higher for 
immigrants (19%-27%) and especially for immigrants from non-English speaking countries (32%-40% for different 
entry cohorts). For UK immigrants, Lindley and Lenton (2006) find, using the RM approach, that 63% of male 
immigrants are overeducated against 37% of male natives. Using a different and older survey on ethnic minorities in 
Britain, Battu and Sloane (2002), also using a form of RM approach, find that around a third of non-whites are 
overeducated, with significant differences between the various ethnic groups. Importantly, they find that when 
incorporating foreign qualifications into their measure, all ethnic minority groups display levels of overeducation 
above 30%. There is a decreasing trend in the US, (Gottschalk and Hansen 2003 and Handel 2003), while there 
seems to be evidence of an increasing trend in Europe (see e.g. Green 2006 on Britain and le Grand et al. 2004 on 
Sweden). 22 
are differences depending on the source of immigrants’ education: 30% of immigrants with a 
foreign-acquired education (vocational or higher) are overeducated, against 20% of immigrants 
with a Danish education (vocational or higher). It must be stressed that apart from the row 
labeled ‘Weighted total’ in Table 13, the other shares shown in Tables 10-14 are based on the 
full sample of individuals (i.e. including those with primary and secondary education as their 
highest level of attained education) and must be interpreted as such. 
 
Returning to Table 13, we see that only one out of ten workers with a vocational education is in a 
job for which he is overeducated and the differences between immigrants and Danes are small. 
For workers with a short higher education, we see that while 25% of ethnic Danes are 
overeducated, the share is 41% for immigrants. The differences between native Danes and 
immigrants are even larger for workers with medium-length higher educations. While 12% of 
native Danes with a medium higher education are overeducated, the share is 33% among 
immigrants. At this level of education, there are also large differences between the two groups of 
immigrants. Almost 60% of immigrants with a foreign medium-length higher education are 
overeducated, while this is true for only 20% of immigrants with a Danish education. Although 
the incidence is greater, the same pattern holds for individuals with a long higher education: 
Immigrants with a Danish education are overeducated to roughly the same extent as native Danes 
with similar levels of education, but immigrants with foreign-acquired credentials are 
substantially more so. The consistent finding that immigrants with a foreign education fare worse 
than immigrants with a Danish education could in principle be more apparent than real. This 
would be true if the apparent overeducation experienced by these individuals is in fact 
compensating for lower quality of these foreign credentials as discussed in Section 2 on human 
capital theory explanations for overeducation. For this study, however, we do not have any way 
of assessing the true quality of the individual immigrant’s foreign-acquired qualifications. 
 
Table 14 details the shares of overeducated workers by occupational category. The first thing to 
note is that the shares are very different in the various categories. High shares of overeducated 
workers are found in categories such as ‘teaching professionals’, ‘teaching associate 
professionals’ ‘office clerks’, ‘customer service clerks’, ‘drivers and mobile plant operators’ and 
‘laborers in mining, construction, manufacturing and transport’. This pattern is similar for both 
native Danes and immigrants, although the levels are higher for immigrants. To put these shares 
into perspective, the table also shows the distribution of workers in our sample across the 
different occupational categories. The category ‘office clerks’ (DISCO 41), for example, 
employs 5% of the sample and is characterized by a high share of overeducated (36%). Another 
example is the category ‘laborer in mining, construction, etc.’ (DISCO 93), which employs 6% 
of the sample of immigrants and in which 31% are overeducated. 
 
There are indications in our data that the phenomenon of overeducation is quite persistent. Table 
15 shows, for workers who were overeducated in each of the years 1995-1997, their job-to-
education match five years later. In general we find that 70-74% of native Danes are still 
overeducated five years later. The share is slightly higher for immigrants: 74-76%. Once again 
there are differences between immigrants with Danish and foreign educations. The persistence of 
overeducation among immigrants with a Danish education is similar to that of native Danes, 
whereas the persistence of overeducation is stronger among immigrants with a foreign degree: 23 




5.2. Determinants of overeducation 
The results of the random effects logit model estimations are shown in Table 16. Note that the 
estimations are performed only for a sub-sample of individuals who have either a vocational 
education or a short, medium or long higher education. The reason for this is that the results 
concerning the incidence of overeducation in Section 5.1 revealed that the share of overeducated 
among those with no more than a primary or a secondary education is zero (see Table 13 and the 
comment regarding Table 9 in the text). As mentioned earlier, the mean sample values for this 
particular sub-sample are shown in Appendix Table A3. 
 
Table 16 shows the results in terms of the estimated coefficients as well as their marginal effects. 
Coefficients in a logit model cannot be interpreted directly as marginal probabilities as they 
would in a linear regression and therefore their marginal effects have been calculated. Marginal 
effects show the change in the probability of being overeducated (in percentage points) caused 
by a one unit change in each of the explanatory variables evaluated at the mean values of all the 
explanatory variables.  
 
In contrast with most other overeducation studies we are able to account directly for labor market 
experience in the host country, and therefore we have chosen to include all three variables: age, 
labor market experience, and years-since-migration (YSM) (and their squares)
38 in the 
equations.
39 This allows us to distinguish between labor-market relevant years spent in Denmark 
and years spent “just being here”. As a consequence, we generally find that age does not 
significantly affect the probability of being overeducated.
40 Danish labor market experience, on 
the other hand, has a strongly significant negative impact on the probability of being 
overeducated for both sub-groups of immigrants. 
 
Since we can account directly for labor market experience acquired in Denmark, we find that 
YSM has a positive yet diminishing effect on the probability of being overeducated. This result 
is significant for immigrants with a foreign education, but not so for immigrants with a Danish 
                                              
37 Analysing overeducation in Sweden, Böhlmark (2003) finds that more than 50% of workers found to be 
overeducated at the beginning of the study period are still poorly matched 10 years later (based on data for 
individuals observed in 1981 and 1991 and then for individuals observed in 1991 and 2000). Also, he finds that a 
considerable share of adequately matched workers that make transitions do so to poorer matches. See e.g. Rubb 
(2003b) for an analysis on the persistence of overeducation in the United States. 
38 We start by describing the linear results separately and thereafter in combination with their squared counterparts. 
39 Other studies which do not account explicitly for labour market experience capture this effect indirectly in the 
YSM variable, which therefore has a negative sign. In the study by Lindley and Lenton (2006), for example, this 
leads the authors to conclude that there is evidence of assimilation in overeducation. Although immigrants are more 
likely to be overeducated than natives upon arrival to (in this case) the UK, higher skilled immigrant workers tend to 
reduce this likelihood with duration in the UK. Our results are able to be more precise about the assimilation process 
by demonstrating that it is labour market attachment that reduces the likelihood of higher skilled immigrants being 
overeducated. Battu and Sloane (2004) include age rather than YSM or labour market experience (also for the case 
of Britain) and therefore their results are parallel to those of Lindley and Lenton (2006). 
40 An exception is for immigrants with foreign-acquired educations, where age has a negative and diminishing 
impact. 24 
education. Combined with the results for labor market experience reported above, this may be 
interpreted as saying that “just” living in the country is not enough to ensure an adequate job-to-
education match. It is concrete labor market experience that is needed to increase the chances of 
an appropriate match. It follows that years spent in Denmark outside the labor force reduce an 
immigrant’s chances of securing an adequate job-to-education match. This can be explained by 
formal human capital skills being depreciated during long periods of unemployment, although 
some of the time may of course be spent accumulating other labor-market relevant skills such as 
Danish language proficiency.  
 
Note that the three continuous variables age, experience and YSM enter the equations as 
polynomials and therefore they ought to be interpreted together with their squared counterparts. 
Also, these three variables are closely correlated – another reason why they should be interpreted 
together. To provide the “full picture” we have calculated the effect of accumulating labor 
market experience in Denmark for immigrants with a Danish education and for immigrants with 
a foreign education. Our first example is a “typical” educated 40-year-old immigrant with a 
Danish education (with YSM = 20, a vocational or a higher education, and a probability of being 
overeducated = 20.3%). Accumulating 10 years of labor market experience (and taking account 
of the simultaneous effects of increased age and increased YSM) reduces his probability of being 
overeducated by 11.8 percentage points. Not accumulating any labor market experience at all 
over a period of 10 years, on the other hand, increases the likelihood of becoming overeducated 
by 6.4 percentage points. Our second example is a “typical” educated 40-year-old immigrant 
with a foreign education (with YSM = 10, a vocational or a higher education, and a probability 
of being overeducated = 29.6%). Accumulating 10 years of labor market experience (and taking 
account of the simultaneous effects of increased age and increased YSM) reduces his probability 
of being overeducated by 3.4 percentage points. Not accumulating any labor market experience 
at all over a period of 10 years, on the other hand, increases his likelihood of becoming 
overeducated by 3.9 percentage points. 
 
These results point out that it is extremely important for both groups of immigrants to gain 
experience on the Danish labor market in order to reduce their risk of becoming overeducated. 
But both the benefits of having experience and the adverse effects of not having any experience 
are larger for immigrants with a Danish education. Indeed these results suggest that immigrants 
with a foreign education have a difficult time affecting their risk of overeducation, even through 
accumulation of labor market experience. These findings fit well with the results of the equation 
for immigrants in total, showing that having a foreign-acquired education strongly increases the 
risk of being overeducated (a result also found in other studies such as Battu and Sloane, 2004 
and Lindley and Lenton, 2006). Foreign qualifications do not seem to be valued very highly by 
Danish employers. It is worth noting that the probability of being overeducated does not increase 
monotonically with the length of education for native Danes and for immigrants with a Danish 
education. First of all, there are relatively few individuals with a short higher education on which 
to base the estimate. But more importantly, medium-length higher educations in Denmark are 
typically extremely vocationally oriented and include educations such as nurse training, school 
teachers and kindergarten teachers – all of which are educations directly oriented towards 
specific occupations. This is most certainly one reason why the probability of being 
overeducated is lower for individuals with a medium-length higher education compared with 
individuals with either a short or a long higher education.  25 
 
Turning to the equation for immigrants with foreign education, one sees that being placed 
initially on Track 1 of the Danish language training programmed slightly reduces one’s risk of 
being overeducated, whilst being placed on Track 2 significantly increases it. The reference 
category is Track 3.
41 Recall that it is individuals who have not learned to read and write their 
mother tongue or the Latin alphabet who are placed on Track 1. In this sub-sample this would 
typically be workers with vocational training, whose risk of being overeducated is low. The 
second track is for individuals with a short higher education from their home-country. The 
results here suggest that workers initially placed on Track 2 are more at risk of becoming 
overeducated compared with workers initially placed on Track 3. 
 
Other studies, such as Green et al. (2005), show that immigrants to Australia, who do not have 
English as their primary language, have a significantly reduced chance of being employed at all. 
So it seems safe to say that strong language skills are important in terms of labor market 
attachment and therefore those that do secure a job (almost regardless of the match) probably 
have at least a minimum level of Danish language skills necessary to perform that particular job. 
In any case, our results in section 5.1 indicated that fewer immigrants with a Danish education 
are overeducated compared with immigrants with a foreign education. This result is probably due 
to a combination of two effects: First, employers are more at ease about employing individuals 
with a Danish education because they are familiar with the content and are able to assess the 
quality hereof because they know the grading and evaluation systems being used. Second, 
individuals who have completed a Danish education have thereby proved to master the Danish 
language at a certain level.  
 
Finally, note that in all four estimations, we find that the correlation coefficient rho is large and 
highly significant. This means that there are substantial unobserved individual effects that affect 
the probability of being overeducated.
42 
5.3. Earnings consequences of overeducation 
The main results of the random effects wage regressions are presented in Table 17, while the 
complete results may be found in Appendix Tables A5-A8. There are separate estimations for 
each of the four groups: immigrants in total, immigrants with a Danish education, immigrants 
with a foreign education, and native Danes. As for the logit estimations, we restrict ourselves to 
the sub-sample of workers with either a vocational education or a short, medium or long higher 
                                              
41 The track variables are only included in the equation for immigrants with a foreign education because this is 
where it is most relevant. In general, immigrants who have completed a Danish education must be assumed to have 
sufficient Danish language skills and do not need the type of general language training provided by the public 
authorities. Also, this particular language training programme has only been provided (and registered) since 1999. 
Most immigrants who have completed a Danish education will probably have arrived in Denmark some time before 
1999 and will therefore have participated in other Danish language training programmes. Indeed, the data show that 
less than 2% of immigrants with a Danish education are placed on one of the tracks in this language training 
programme. 
42 The results also show e.g. an increasing tendency for native Danes to experience overeducation during the period 
2000-2002 compared to earlier years. This result is most probably due to a data break in the DISCO variable. As of 
the year 2000, certain sources of information used to construct the DISCO variable are no longer available to 
Statistics Denmark, resulting in a reduced number of individuals with relevant DISCO classifications. This problem, 
however, is judged to be of minor importance for this analysis. 26 
education. In the first set of regressions, we include attained (actual) schooling as a single 
variable. In the second set of regressions, we split attained (actual) years of schooling into the 
three components described in Section 4.3 above: adequate education, overeducation and 
undereducation. 
 
To begin with, it is worth noting that the results are generally in accordance with the “stylized 
facts” in the existing overeducation literature (Hartog 2000, Rubb 2003a): 
(1)  Returns to adequate schooling (Regression II) are higher than returns to actual education 
(Regression I).  
(2)  Returns to overeducation are positive, but smaller than to adequate education.  
(3)  Returns to undereducation are negative and smaller in magnitude than the returns to 
adequate education.
43 
In other words, one typically finds that overeducated workers earn more than adequately 
matched workers in the same kinds of jobs, but less than adequately matched workers with 
similar amounts of education. 
 
Starting with Regression I, we find that the return to each year of schooling for immigrants with 
a Danish education (7.2%) is not very different from that of native Danes (7.4%). The returns to 
schooling for immigrants with a foreign education are notably lower (4.3%). When splitting 
years of acquired schooling into the three components in Regression II we find that there are 
virtually no difference between the estimated coefficients on adequate schooling for Danes and 
immigrants – irrespective of source of education. But here we find more striking differences 
regarding the return to overeducation. Immigrants with a Danish education are rewarded by only 
a 3.7% increase in wages per year of overeducation (less than half the return to a year of 
adequate education), whereas native Danes are rewarded by 5.4% per year of overeducation (two 
thirds of the return to a year of adequate education). In other words, the penalty for being 
overeducated is more severe for immigrants with a Danish education compared with native 
Danes. Immigrants with a foreign education are penalized even more for being overeducated in 
that each year of excess education brings about only 1.1% higher wages.
44  
 
Language skills are an important determinant of wages, a result also found in other studies such 
as Battu and Sloane (2004). In the regressions for immigrants with foreign credentials, the 
impact of not being enrolled in Danish language courses (i.e. Danish missing = 1) is positive and 
                                              
43 One result that is not in accordance with theses stylized facts is that the coefficient on the undereducation variable 
is positive and significant for immigrants with a foreign education. An explanation for this somewhat surprising 
result could be selection problems (see the discussion in Section 4). If undereducated workers are primarily to be 
found among those who earn higher wages, we will be underestimating the adverse impact of being undereducated 
on wages. Also, it is worth recalling that for immigrants with a foreign education, information about their level of 
education is self-reported (see the data description in section 3) and could therefore be misreported. One should 
therefore be cautious when interpreting these results.  
44 A relevant question to ask is whether the lower returns to overeducation can simply be attributed to a concave 
wage-schooling profile because quadratic terms are not included in the model (not only here but in all overeducation 
studies that take the ORU wage equation as its point of departure). Investigating this empirically for this particular 
data set shows that the wage profile is actually convex in actual schooling and convex in adequate schooling for both 
native Danes and immigrants. The wage profile is convex in overeducation for immigrants with a foreign education. 
For immigrants with a Danish education, the wage profile is linear in overeducation, whilst it is concave in 
overeducation for native Danes. See Belzil and Hansen (2002) for a more general investigation of the shape of the 
wage-schooling relationship. 27 
significant. One possible explanation for this result is that e.g. well-educated researchers or IT 
specialists from e.g. China or India may work in Danish companies or institutes where English is 
the main language and they therefore do not need to learn Danish to do well. Another possible 
explanation is that Danish courses for individuals in such positions are paid and organized by the 
company and provided by private language schools instead of the (free) public language schools 
because the latter do not match the needs of these particularly high-skilled workers. Conversely, 
being enrolled in either Track 1 or 2 of Danish language courses (rather than the reference Track 
3) significantly reduces wages.  
 
In Section 4.3, two hypotheses were put forth:  123 1: H α αα = =  and  23 2: 0 H α α = = . 
Accepting hypothesis H1 amounts to saying that the return to (an additional year of) schooling is 
the same for all individuals with the same level of schooling, regardless of whether the individual 
is in a job that matches his qualifications or whether he is over- or undereducated. It is his actual 
schooling that matters – not the match. The second hypothesis H2 amounts to saying that 
“excess” and “deficit” years of schooling (compared to job requirements) are neither rewarded 
nor penalized. It is the education requirements of the job (s
R) alone that have an impact on 
earnings. Tests of the two hypotheses are strongly rejected for all estimations, which simply goes 
to saying that both required and acquired education are part of the wage story.  
  
Comparing the results in the Appendix Tables A6 and A7, i.e. immigrants with Danish and 
foreign educations, respectively, it can be concluded that while age and experience have virtually 
the same positive effects on wages for both sub-groups, years-since-migration has a greater 
negative effect for immigrants with a foreign education compared with immigrants with a Danish 
education. This is not surprising because years-since-migration (given labor market experience in 
Denmark) for the latter group reflect, at least partly, years spent in the Danish education system 
obtaining a qualifying education, while for immigrants without a Danish education years-since-
migration would typically be years outside the labor market and education system.  
 
6. Discussion and conclusions 
This paper has investigated three questions related to immigrant overeducation in Denmark. 
First, to what extent are immigrants employed in jobs for which they are formally overqualified? 
Using a measure based on realized job-to-education matches, we find that out of the full sample 
of workers 16% of immigrants are overeducated compared with 11% of native Danes. A third of 
the immigrants in our sample, however, have no more than primary or secondary schooling and 
cannot therefore – by our definition – be overeducated. We have therefore also calculated 
overeducation shares for the sub-sample of workers who have vocational or higher education. 
We find that 25% of male first-generation non-Western immigrants with a vocational or a higher 
education are overeducated. Fewer immigrants with a Danish (vocational or higher) education 
(20%) are overeducated compared with immigrants with a foreign (vocational or higher) 
education (30%). The incidence of overeducation is notably higher for immigrants than for 
native Danes, which is estimated to be around 15% for workers with a vocational or a higher 
education. These findings are consistent with the existing literature. 
 
In trying to understand why some individuals are more likely to become overeducated than 
others, we estimated a set of random effects logit models. We found that Danish labor market 28 
experience is extremely important in reducing the probability of becoming overeducated. 
Furthermore, once having taken account of labor market experience, we find that years spent in 
the country not necessarily on the labor market (as measured by a years-since-migration 
variable) actually increase the probability of being overeducated. Combined, these results can be 
interpreted as meaning that it is concrete years spent in the labor market that determine your 
chances of an appropriate job-to-education match, not general assimilation accumulated by “just 
being here”.  
 
Our final question concerned the wage consequences of overeducation. For this purpose we 
estimated a series of random effects wage regressions. Our study finds that years of 
overeducation do increase wages for native Danes and for immigrants with Danish educations, 
but much less so than years of adequate education. In particular, the penalty for overeducation is 
much larger for immigrants (particularly for those with foreign credentials) than for native 
Danes. These results are in accordance with our expectations, i.e. that an overeducated worker 
earns more than an adequately matched worker in the same type of job, but less than he could 
earn if he secured a job that matched his level of schooling.  
 
The validity of these results is of course limited by the precision with which we can measure 
overeducation and the degree of reliability we can attach to the information we have on foreign-
acquired education. In any case, it must be stressed that workers are very heterogeneous with 
regard not only to observable qualifications, but most certainly also with regard to unobservable 
skills, abilities, etc. Moreover, jobs within a specific occupational category are also 
heterogeneous in terms of which qualifications are required to perform them. Therefore, with the 
data available for this study it is difficult to say how much of our measured overeducation is 
more apparent than real and whether overeducation among immigrants is in fact even more 
common than our results indicate. For this we would have to supplement our register-based data 
with survey-based information on specific job-related skills (e.g. entrepreneurial, teamwork, 
management and leadership skills), quality of the attained degree (through e.g. grades), pre-
degree measures of ability, etc. as well as information on how these qualifications and skills are 
used in each person’s job. In particular, we lack more concrete information about how foreign 
qualifications are being assessed and used in the Danish labor market. How many immigrants 
with foreign qualifications have sought to have them assessed through official channels and what 
were the outcomes? How do Danish employers view individuals with foreign-acquired 
qualifications – officially assessed or not? Research from Australia shows that official 
assessments of foreign qualifications can potentially reduce the risk of overeducation for some 
immigrant groups (Green et al. 2005). Indeed, these are interesting topics for future research on 
immigrant overeducation in Denmark pending data availability.   
 
These caveats notwithstanding, our results lead us to draw up three policy recommendations. 
First of all, it is important to strengthen the focus on recognizing foreign qualifications. All 
immigrants with a foreign-acquired education and labor market experience ought to have their 
qualifications assessed through e.g. CIRIUS, an authority within the Danish Ministry of 
Education, which undertakes such tasks. It is conceivable that an official evaluation of an 
immigrant’s skills and qualifications would help him find a job that matches his “true” 
qualifications and skills. Second, an official assessment may not be enough for some groups of 
immigrants. Our results show that years-since-migration significantly increases the risk of being 29 
overeducated for immigrants with foreign qualifications once having taken account for labor 
market experience. This is probably in part because during years spent getting settled in the 
country and learning the language, an immigrant’s formal skills may easily become depreciated 
or outdated. In certain cases it may therefore be appropriate to offer supplementary training to 
upgrade and increase the relevance of his foreign-acquired qualifications for a Danish context. 
Individuals with a long higher education have a relatively high probability of being overeducated 
and the costs (i.e. in terms of wasted education-related investments) are relatively large if these 
individuals do not secure an appropriately matched job. This leads us to the third and final policy 
recommendation. It may be worth providing intensive Danish language training to especially 
those immigrants with higher levels of education, enabling them to enter the labor market in 
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long All N 
Native Danes  23.1  3.8  47.5 5.3 12.4 8.0  100  520,677
Immigrants, 
all non-Western  25.9  7.8  33.9 7.9 14.2 10.3  100  65,909
     Turkey  58.9  4.6  20.9 4.4 8.7 2.5  100  9,841
     Pakistan  39.2  18.5  24.7 4.0 7.7 5.7  100  3,774
     Vietnam  23.9  2.9  47.5 8.8 12.4 4.5  100  4,791
     Iran  5.6  4.9  25.5 12.2 31.5 20.4  100  7,357
     Iraq  11.6  9.8  25.7 10.5 22.3 20.2  100  2,413
     Ex-
Yugoslavia  22.1 7.3  48.4 6.3 9.7 6.3 
100 
12,347
     Somalia  16.3  19.9  34.3 9.3 8.6 11.6  100  594
     Stateless  15.9  8.5  37.1 9.0 16.0 13.6  100  1,819
     Other non-  
     Western  21.1  9.0  33.8 9.0 14.0 13.1 
100 
22,973
Note: The data set covers male wage earners aged 30-57, with what amounts to at least 2 months of full-
time employment in a given year. Individuals undertaking education and individuals employed in the 
military or in management positions are excluded. The data set includes first-generation non-Western 
immigrants with either a Danish education or a foreign acquired education, for which Statistics Denmark 
has survey-based information. Immigrants for whom Statistics Denmark has calculated imputed levels of 




















long All N 
Native Danes  23.1  3.8  47.5 5.3 12.4 8.0  100  520,677
Immigrants, 
all non-Western  25.9  7.8  33.9 7.9 14.2 10.3  100  65,909
– Immigrants 
with Danish 
education 21.9  2.6  34.1 9.2 19.8 12.4  100  30,740
– Immigrants 
with foreign 
education 29.4  12.2  33.8 6.8 9.3 8.4  100  35,169
Note: See note for Table 1. 
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n All  N 
Native Danes  13.6  49.9 17.6 18.9  100  520,677
Immigrants, 
all non-Western  22.0  51.3 10.9 15.8  100  65,909
     Turkey  32.1  54.2 5.5 8.3  100  9,841
     Pakistan  31.6  52.1 6.4 9.8  100  3,774
     Vietnam  10.9  66.3 11.5 11.3  100  4,791
     Iran  7.9  32.9 25.4 33.8  100  7,357
     Iraq  14.9  43.8 10.5 30.8  100  2,413
     Ex-Yugoslavia  24.8  63.0 5.7 6.5  100  12,347
     Somalia  17.5  51.0 9.3 22.2  100  594
     Stateless  15.7  48.5 12.7 23.1  100  1,819
     Other Non-Western  22.8  47.5 11.9 17.8  100  22,973
Note: See note for Table 1. 
 
 














n All  N 
Native Danes  13.6  49.9 17.6 18.9  100  520,677
Immigrants,  
All non-Western  22.0  51.3 10.9 15.8  100  65,909
– Immigrants with 
Danish education  12.7  45.4 18.5 23.4  100  30,740
– Immigrants with 
foreign education  30.1  56.5 4.2 9.2  100  35,169
Note: See note for Table 1. 
 













 Primary  31.4  57.9 8.0 2.7  100  120,055
 Secondary  10.1  35.3 30.9 23.7  100  19,679
 Vocational  11.5  66.5 16.5 5.4  100  247,539
Higher education, 








long  1.0 3.4 11.4 84.2 
 
100  41,483
All native Danes  13.6  49.9 17.6 18.9  100  520,677
Note: See note for Table 1. 37 













 Primary  36.1  60.4 2.0 1.6  100  17,090
 Secondary  29.3  55.5 6.6 8.5  100  5,117
 Vocational  20.7  68.9 6.9 3.6  100  22,368
Higher education, 












immigrants 22.0  51.3 10.9 15.8 
100 
65,909
Note: See note for Table 1. 
 
 
Table 7. Educational attainment and wage-earner job skill level of immigrants with Danish 












  Primary 34.3 60.0 3.7  2.1  100  6,740 
  Secondary  17.9 45.0 19.9 17.3 100  811 
  Vocational  10.6 75.1 10.7 3.5  100  10,481 
Higher education, 








long  0.5 3.2 10.4  85.9 
100 
3,811 
All    12.7 45.4  18.5 23.4  100  30,740 
Note: See note for Table 1. 
 
Table 8. Educational attainment and wage-earner job skill level of immigrants with foreign 












 Primary  37.3  60.7 0.9 1.2  100  10,350
 Secondary  31.4  57.5 4.2 6.9  100  4,306
 Vocational  29.6  63.4 3.4 3.6  100  11,887
Higher education, 








long 15.5  28.2 10.1 46.2 
100 
2,957
All   30.1  56.5 4.2 9.2  100  35,169
Note: See note for Table 1. 38 
Table 9. Defining occupation-to-education mismatch using the adjusted RM approach, measured 





















Physical, mathematical and engineering 
science professionals  21 15.0 15.0 18.6
Life science and health professionals  22 15.8 17.8  19.7
Teaching professionals  23 12.2 16.0  16.0
Social science and humanities 
professionals 24 12.7 15.0  17.3
Other professionals, nec.  2 13.1 16.0  17.9
Technicians and associate 
professionals 
 
Physical and engineering science 
associate professionals  31 11.4 14.0  15.3
Life science and health associate 
professionals 32 12.6 15.0  16.2
Teaching associate professionals  33 10.5 14.0  14.0
Sales and service associate professionals  34 13.0 13.0  16.9
Other technicians and associate 
professionals, nec.  3 10.6 13.7  15.2
Clerks  
Office clerks  41 8.3 13.0  13.0
Customer service clerks  42 9.5 13.0  13.0
Other clerks, nec.  4 9.4 13.0  13.0
Service workers and shop and market 
sales workers 
 
Personal and protective services workers  51 10.9 13.0  15.1
Models, salespersons and demonstrators 52 13.0 13.0  13.0
Other service and sales workers, nec.  5 9.5 13.0  14.2
Skilled agricultural and fisheries 
workers 
 
Market-oriented skilled agricultural and 
fishery workers  61 8.7 12.0  13.8
Craft and related trades workers   
Extraction and building trade workers  71 13.7 13.7  17.3
Metal, machinery and related trades 
workers 72 14.0 14.0  14.0
Precision, handicraft, printing and related 
trades workers  73 10.6 14.0  14.0
Other craft and related trades workers  74 10.7 13.7  15.2
Other craft and related trades workers, 
nec. 7 9.2 13.0  14.3






















Stationary plant and related operators  81 8.5 13.0  14.1
Machine operators and assemblers  82 8.7 12.2  14.2
Drivers and mobile plant operators  83 7.4 10.0  13.0
Other plant and machine operators, nec.  8 8.9 10.0  14.1
Elementary occupations   
Sales and services elementary 
occupations 91 8.6 13.0  14.1
Agricultural, fishery and related laborers  92 8.8 10.0  13.7
Laborers in mining, construction, 
manufacturing and transport  93 8.1 10.0  13.5
Other elementary occupations, nec.  9 7.8 10.0  13.3
Note (a): See note for Table 1. 
Note (b): In the data, the length of a given education is given as the maximum number of months required 
to obtain that education. 
Note (c): For some individuals, information about occupation is only provided at the 1-digit DISCO-88 
level, and hence limits are calculated separately for these “not elsewhere classified (nec.)” categories, e.g. 
2, 3, 4.  40 






Native Danes  11.0  71.1  17.9  100.0 
Immigrants,  
all non-Western  16.3  66.1  15.6 
 
100.0 
     Turkey  8.2  54.2  37.6  100.0 
     Pakistan  10.3  71.3  18.4  100.0 
     Vietnam  10.4  75.0  14.6  100.0 
     Iran  21.3  72.4  6.3  100.0 
     Iraq  23.9  59.9  16.2  100.0 
     Ex-Yugoslavia  18.4  64.3  17.3  100.0 
     Somalia  15.5  65.8  18.7  100.0 
     Stateless  16.7  72.1  11.2  100.0 
     Other non-West.  18.6  67.6  13.8  100.0 
Note: See note for Table 1. 
 
 






Native  Danes  11.0 71.1 17.9  100.0 
Immigrants,  total  16.3 66.1 15.6  100.0 
– Immigrants with 
Danish  education  15.3 72.7 12.0 
 
100.0 
– Immigrants with 
foreign  education  17.3 60.3 22.4 
 
100.0 
Note: See note for Table 1. 
 
 








all non-Western  16.3  15.3  17.3 
     Turkey  8.2  6.4  9.6 
     Pakistan  10.3  8.6  11.6 
     Vietnam  10.4  10.9  8.4 
     Iran  21.3  20.0  27.9 
     Iraq  23.9  28.1  22.0 
     Ex-Yugoslavia  18.4  14.3  19.7 
     Somalia  15.5  11.2  17.6 
     Stateless  16.7  16.5  17.0 
     Other non-Western  18.6  18.2  18.9 
Note: See note for Table 1. 
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Table 13. Percentage overeducated by level and source of education among native Danes and 
immigrants, 1995-2002 





Primary  0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
Secondary  0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
Vocational  10.7  10.5 9.3 11.6 
Short higher 
education  25.1 40.8 43.8 37.3 
Medium higher 
education  12.3 33.3 19.6 58.8 
Long higher 
education  38.5 47.0 34.2 63.4 
All  11.0 16.3 15.3 17.3 
Weighted total
(b)  15.0 24.6 20.3 29.6 
Note (a): See note for Table 1. 
Note (b): The ‘Weighted total’ shows the shares of overeducated among the sub-sample of individual who 
have either a vocational education or a higher education (short, medium or long). By contrast, the row 
labeled ‘All’ contains the shares of overeducated among the total sample, i.e. including those with a 
primary or a secondary education. 42 






















Physical, mathematical and 
engineering science professionals  21 2.7 6.3 4.0 6.75
Life science and health 
professionals  22 7.1 1.4 4.4 3.1
Teaching professionals  23 23.9 5.8 31.4  3.7
Social science and humanities 
professionals 24 4.0 5.2 4.3  1.9
Other professionals, nec.  2 11.7 0.2 14.2  0.35
Technicians and associate 
professionals 
 
Physical and engineering science 
associate professionals  31 13.1 6.0 27.4  4.8
Life science and health associate 
professionals 32 3.2 0.7 6.8  1.1
Teaching associate professionals  33 24.5 1.7 41.4  2.5
Sales and service associate 
professionals 34 6.2 8.9 15.5  2.2
Other technicians and associate 
professionals, nec.  3 15.4 0.5 21.1  0.3
Clerks   
Office clerks  41 24.8 4.8 35.8  5.1
Customer service clerks  42 15.7 0.5 42.7  0.2
Other clerks, nec.  4 20.6 0.7 35.8  0.8
Service workers and shop and 
market sales workers 
 
Personal and protective services 
workers 51 1.9 4.0 8.6  5.7
Models, salespersons and 
demonstrators 52 16.8 1.6 24.1  0.7
Other service and sales workers, 
nec. 5 5.4 0.1 7.9  0.3




agricultural and fishery workers  61 9.2 1.0 30.4  0.2
Craft and related trades workers   
Extraction and building trade 
workers 71 0.1 8.3 0.0    3.1
Metal, machinery and related 




















Precision, handicraft, printing and 
related trades workers  73 5.6 0.9 21.7 0.6
Other craft and related trades 
workers  74 0.5 1.2 5.1 0.8
Other craft and related trades 
workers, nec.  7 15.6 1.9 16.8  1.9
Plant and machine operators 
and assemblers 
 
Stationary plant and related 
operators 81 6.7 1.1 10.1  1.4
Machine operators and assemblers  82 2.7 6.2 8.9  13.7
Drivers and mobile plant operators  83 26.2 5.0 28.3  4.3
Other plant and machine operators, 
nec.  8 2.4 1.8 9.2 5.0
Elementary occupations   
Sales and services elementary 
occupations 91 25.2 2.8 11.6  8.6
Agricultural, fishery and related 
laborers 92 11.8 0.5 26.8  0.5
Laborers in mining, construction, 
manufacturing and transport  93 28.6 6.5 30.8  6.4
Other elementary occupations, nec.  9 50.6 3.8 25.6  6.5
All  11.0 100.0 16.3 100.0
Note (a): See note for Table 1. 
Note (b): In the data, the length of a given education is given as the maximum number of months required 
to obtain that education. 
Note (c): For some individuals, information about occupation is only provided at the 1-digit DISCO-88 
level, and hence limits are calculated separately for these “not elsewhere classified (nec.)” categories, e.g. 
2, 3, 4.  44 
Table 15. Persistence of overeducation among native Danes and immigrants, 1995-2002 
Overeducated in year  Adequately matched 
5 years later 
Overeducated 
5 years later 
Undereducated 
5 years later 
 Percent 
Danes     
1995 29.5  69.9  0.6 
1996 29.4  70.0  0.6 
1997 25.7  73.6  0.7 
      
Immigrants, total     
1995 26.0  73.8  0.2 
1996 25.3  74.0  0.7 
1997 23.3  76.2  0.5 
      
Immigrants, Danish 
education 
   
1995 35.6  64.4  0.0 
1996 34.4  65.2  0.4 
1997 25.3  73.7  1.0 
      
Immigrants, foreign 
education 
   
1995 17.3  82.3  0.4 
1996 16.4  82.5  1.1 
1997 21.6  78.4  0.0 
Note (a): See note for Table 1. 
Note (b) Calculated only for those who are overeducated in the given year and wage-employed with at 
least 2 months full-time employment (not military nor management) five years later. 45 
Table 16. Results of random effects logit model estimations  
Immigrants, total    Native Danes 















Age -0.09    0.07  -0.14   Age -0.027   0.03  -0.01
Age
2/100 0.15    0.09  0.24   Age
2/100 0.071 *  0.03  0.02
Experience  -0.05  *  0.03 -0.08   Experience  -0.101 ***  0.01 -0.03
Exp.
2/100 0.07    0.08  0.12   Exp.
2/100 0.069 *  0.03  0.02
YSM 0.07  **  0.03  0.11        
YSM
2/100 -0.20  ***  0.06 -0.32        
Children (#)  -0.16    0.47  -0.26   Children (#)  -0.388 * 0.17  -0.10
Single -0.06    0.10  -0.09   Single  0.186 ***  0.04  0.05
Short high 
ed 5.84  ***  0.17  72.81
 Short  high 
ed 3.732 ***  0.07  7.57
Med high ed  5.85  ***  0.17  61.41
 Med  high 
ed  0.469 *** 0.06  0.15
Long high ed  6.47  ***  0.16  78.94
 Long  high 
ed  4.135 *** 0.07  9.35
Foreign educ  1.62  ***  0.13  2.97        
Turkey 0.13    0.22  0.22        
Pakistan -0.61  *  0.24  -0.75        
Vietnam -0.82  ***  0.20  -0.95        
Iran -1.09  ***  0.16  -1.25        
Iraq -0.88  ***  0.25  -0.97        
Ex-
Yugoslavia  0.62 ***  0.15  1.19
 
    
Somalia -0.09    0.45  -0.14        
Stateless -0.60    0.32  -0.73        
1996 0.05    0.13  0.08   1996  -0.091 *  0.04  -0.02
1997  -0.03    0.13 -0.05   1997  -0.249 ***  0.04 -0.06
1998  -0.04    0.12 -0.06   1998  -0.145 ***  0.04 -0.04
1999  0.10    0.13 0.16   1999  0.004   0.04 0.00
2000  0.20    0.13 0.35   2000  0.549 ***  0.04 0.18
2001  0.08    0.13 0.14   2001  0.537 ***  0.04 0.17
2002  0.17    0.14 0.29   2002  0.556 ***  0.04 0.18
Constant -6.72  ***  1.52    Constant  -5.429 ***  0.52 
              
              
Rho 0.89    0.003    Rho  0.881   0.001 
LR chi2(27)   3,551.4        LR chi2(16)  12,012.7    
Prob > chi2  0.0          Prob > chi2  0.0      
Log Likelihd 
-
12,153.7    
   Log 
Likelihd 
-
80,965.4   
 
Obs.   43,702          Obs.   380,943      
               
Legend: * p<0.05; ** p<0.01; *** p<0.001 
Note: (a) The estimations are performed using a sub-sample consisting of workers with either a vocational 
education or a short, medium, or long higher education. 
(b) The reference category for ethnic origin is “Other non-Western countries”. 46 
Table 16. (cont.) Results of random effects logit model estimations  
Immigrants with Danish education    Immigrants with foreign education 

















Age  -0.012   0.10  -0.01  Age  -0.29 *  0.11  -0.68 
Age
2/100  0.073   0.12  0.05  Age
2/100 0.37  **  0.14  0.87 
Experience  -0.138 ***  0.03  -0.09  Experience  -0.22 ***  0.04  -0.52 
Exp.
2/100  0.048   0.10  0.03  Exp.
2/100 0.39  **  0.14  0.92 
YSM  0.078   0.04  0.05  YSM  0.28 ***  0.04  0.66 
YSM
2/100 -0.192    0.10  -0.13 
 
YSM
2/100 -0.53  ***  0.10  -1.24 
Children  (#)  -1.213 *  0.60  -0.83  Children  (#)  -0.88   0.68  -2.07 
Single  -0.399 **  0.14  -0.25  Single  0.01   0.16  0.02 
Short  high  ed  5.467 ***  0.24  45.55  Short  high  ed  4.83 ***  0.29  62.28 
Med  high  ed  3.563 ***  0.24  8.55  Med  high  ed  8.89 ***  0.30  97.15 
Long high ed  4.415  ***  0.22  21.50    Long high ed  8.50  ***  0.29  96.55 
         Danish  Track  1  -1.65 *  0.79  -1.96 
         Danish  Track  2  1.58 ***  0.35  7.44 
         Danish-missing  0.07   0.19  0.17 
        
 Danish-missing 
and arrived after 
1.1.1999 -2.57    2.32  -2.23 
Turkey  -0.301   0.30  -0.18  Turkey  0.16   0.27  0.40 
Pakistan  -0.142   0.30  -0.09  Pakistan  -0.99 **  0.31  -1.56 
Vietnam  -0.815 ***  0.24  -0.43  Vietnam
# -  -  -  - 
Iran  -0.918 ***  0.20  -0.52  Iran  1.04 **  0.39  3.97 
Iraq  2.154 ***  0.33  4.70  Iraq  -1.50 ***  0.25  -2.03 
Ex-Yugoslavia  0.930 ***  0.22  0.97  Ex-Yugoslavia  0.06   0.21  0.13 
Somalia  -1.590 *  0.73  -0.56  Somalia  -0.74   1.14  -1.26 
Stateless  -1.542 ***  0.32  -0.58  Stateless  -0.46   0.44  -0.89 
1996  0.212   0.17  0.16  1996  -0.10   0.19  -0.23 
1997  0.036   0.17  0.03  1997  -0.02   0.19  -0.05 
1998  0.007   0.17  0.01  1998  0.01   0.18  0.02 
1999  0.213   0.17  0.16  1999  0.13   0.18  0.33 
2000  0.395 *  0.17  0.31  2000  0.25   0.18  0.65 
2001  0.404 *  0.18  0.32  2001  0.03   0.19  0.08 
2002  0.648 ***  0.18  0.56  2002  -0.02   0.19  -0.06 
Constant  -7.201 ***  2.12    Constant  -2.36   2.30   
                 
                  
Rho  0.901   0.01    Rho  0.90  0.01    
LR chi2(26)   1182.7          LR chi2(29)   2528.4       
Prob > chi2  0.0          Prob > chi2  0.0       
Log Likelihd 
-




5675.1      
Obs.    23,189       Obs.    20,513      
Legend: * p<0.05; ** p<0.01; *** p<0.001 
# This variable has been left out of the estimation due to collinearity. Vietnamese individuals have in this case been assigned a 
value in the “Other non-Western” category instead. 
Note: (a) The estimations are performed using a sub-sample consisting of workers with either a vocational education or a short, 
medium, or long higher education. 
(b) The reference category for ethnic origin is “Other non-Western countries”. 47 
Table 17. Summary of results of random effects wage regressions 
Ln(wage) Immigrants    Native      Immigrants    Immigrants 
 

















   
 
  
Danish Track 1   




Danish Track 2   











after 1.1.1999   




              
R2  Overall  0.219   0.127   0.259    0,145 
Obs.  43,702  380,943     23,189    20,513 
              
Regression II             

































































              
R
2 Overall  0.278   0.141   0.288    0.238 
Obs.  43,702  380,943   23,189    20,513 
              
Note: (a) In the regression for native Danes, controls variables included, but not reported here, are age, (age squared)/100, 
experience in Denmark, (experience in Denmark squared)/100, number of children, marital status and year dummies. In addition 
to these, immigrant equations include YSM (years since migration), YSM
2 and ethnicity dummies. Legend: * p<0.05; ** p<0.01; 
*** p<0.001  
(b) The estimations are performed using a sub-sample consisting of workers with either a vocational education or a short, 
medium, or long higher education. 
(c) The reference category for ethnic origin is “Other non-Western countries”. 48 
Appendix tables  
 
Table A1. Selected sample used in the descriptive Tables 1-15: Danes 




Original sample  4,269,913 
Male 2,112,293  50.5
30 ≤ Age ≤ 57  879,573  58.4
Valid information on highest attained education  856,015  2.7
Valid information on occupational category  771,685  9.9
Not in full-time education  756,596  2.0
Wage-earner 597,449  21.0
Excl. management and military  556,177  6.9
Employed equivalent to at least 2 months full-time per year  520,677      6.4
Final sample  520,677 
 
 
Table A2. Selected sample used in the descriptive Tables 1-15: Immigrants 




Original sample  2,973,377   
First-generation 2,339,039  21.3
Non-western 1,434,711  38.7
Male 742,413  48.3
30 ≤ Age ≤ 57  399,348  46.2
Valid information on highest attained education  337,054  15.6
Valid information on occupational category  212,880  36.8
Not in full-time education  205,666  3.4
Not imputed education  122,668  40.4
Wage-earner 78,234  36.2
Excl. management and military  77,364  1.1
Employed equivalent to at least 2 months full-time per year  65,909  14.8





Table A3. Mean sample values of samples used in the empirical analyses*  
(Results shown in Tables 16-17)  















rate 0.15  0.36  0.25 0.43 0.20 0.40  0.30  0.46
Age 42.78  7.95  40.36 6.94 39.81 6.80  40.98  7.04
Age
2/100 18.93  6.87  16.77 5.89 16.31 5.76  17.29  5.99
Experience 19.50  8.06  8.21 7.15 9.15 7.24  7.15  6.89
Exp.
2/100 4.45  3.20  1.19 1.96 1.36 2.08  0.99  1.79
YSM     16.84 10.33 21.05 8.83  12.08  9.82
YSM
2/100     3.90 3.64 5.21 3.42  2.42  3.29
Children (#)  0.09  0.10  0.12 0.12 0.12 0.12  0.12  0.12
Single 0.20  0.40  0.21 0.41 0.23 0.42  0.19  0.39
Log wage  5.24  0.31  5.11 0.30 5.16 0.30  5.06  0.29
Schooling (yrs)  14.28  1.41  14.47 1.62 14.61 1.78  14.31  1.40
Adequate (yrs)  14.17  1.28  14.19 1.43 14.41 1.62  13.94  1.13
Overeduc (yrs)  0.14  0.47  0.32 0.75 0.23 0.61  0.43  0.87
Underedu (yrs)  0.04  0.23  0.04 0.25 0.03 0.23  0.06  0.28
Vocational edu  0.65  0.48  0.51 0.50 0.45 0.50  0.58  0.49
Short higher ed  0.07  0.26  0.12 0.32 0.12 0.33  0.12  0.32
Med. higher ed  0.17  0.37  0.21 0.41 0.26 0.44  0.16  0.37
Long higher ed  0.11  0.31  0.15 0.36 0.16 0.37  0.14  0.35
Foreign  educ      0.47 0.50      
Danish Track 1              0.01  0.09
Danish Track 2              0.08  0.27
Danish Track 3              0.12  0.32
Danish-
missing             0.79  0.40
Danish-
missing & 
arrive ≥ 1999              0.00  0.02
Turkey     0.08 0.27 0.07 0.25  0.10  0.30
Pakistan     0.04 0.19 0.03 0.17  0.04  0.20
Vietnam     0.08 0.27 0.13 0.34  0.02  0.14
Iran     0.15 0.36 0.25 0.43  0.04  0.19
Iraq     0.04 0.20 0.03 0.17  0.06  0.24
Ex-Yugoslavia     0.20 0.40 0.08 0.27  0.33  0.47
Somalia     0.01 0.09 0.01 0.08  0.01  0.11
Stateless     0.03 0.17 0.04 0.20  0.02  0.14
Oth non-West      0.37 0.48 0.36 0.48  0.38  0.48
Number of 
observations 380,943  43,702  23,189  20,513 
* Compared to the samples selected for the descriptive analyses (shown in Appendix Tables A1 and A2) 
the samples for the empirical analyses consider only individuals with a vocational education or a short, 
medium, or long higher education. See Section 5.2 for a discussion. 50 
Table A4. Selected mean values of the immigrant samples used in the descriptive statistics, the 
empirical estimations and a comparison sample 
 













 Mean    Mean   Mean  
Age 40.0    40.4 40.4  
Experience 8.9    8.2 5.0  
YSM 17.7    16.8 28.8  
Foreign educ  53.4    46.9 38.7  
Schooling (yrs)  12.7    14.5 11.9  
Primary edu  25.9    0.0 33.2  
Secondary   7.8    0.0 11.3  
Vocational edu  33.9    51.2 29.8  
Short higher ed  7.9    12.0 7.3  
Med. higher ed  14.2    21.4 10.5  
Long higher ed  10.3    15.5 7.9  
       
Number of 
observations 65,909  43,702  337,054 
* With valid (i.e. non-missing) information about highest level of education attained. 51 













Schooling  0.074  ***  0.001   Adequate    0.079  *** 0.001
        Overeduc    0.054  *** 0.001
        Undereduc    -0.047  *** 0.002
Age 0.029  ***  0.001   Age  0.029  *** 0.001
Age
2/100 -0.037  ***  0.001   Age
2/100 -0.036  *** 0.001
Experience 0.014  ***  0.000   Experience  0.014  *** 0.000
Exp.
2/100 -0.018  ***  0.001   Exp.
2/100 -0.018  *** 0.001
Children (#)  0.068  ***  0.005   Children (#)  0.067  *** 0.005
Single -0.002  *  0.001   Single  -0.003  *  0.001
1996 0.007  ***  0.001   1996  0.007  *** 0.001
1997 -0.003  **  0.001   1997  -0.003  **  0.001
1998 0.031  ***  0.001   1998  0.031  *** 0.001
1999 0.032  ***  0.001   1999  0.032  *** 0.001
2000 0.041  ***  0.001   2000  0.041  *** 0.001
2001 0.060  ***  0.001   2001  0.060  *** 0.001
2002 0.059  ***  0.001   2002  0.060  *** 0.001
Constant 3.424  ***  0.018   Constant 3.368  *** 0.018
               
               
rho  0.825      rho  0.818     
Wald chi2 (14)  35,668.3   
   Wald  chi2 
(16) 36975.18 
  
Prob > chi2  0.0        Prob > chi2  0.0     
Obs.    380,943      Obs.    380,943     
R2:  Within  0.075      R2:  Within  0.074     
      Between  0.129   
               
     Between  0.145 
  
      Overall  0.127             Overall  0.141     
               
Note: (a) In the regression for native Danes, controls variables included, but not reported here, are age, 
(age squared)/100, experience in Denmark, (experience in Denmark squared)/100, number of children, 
marital status and year dummies. In addition to these, immigrant equations include YSM (years since 
migration), YSM
2 and ethnicity dummies. Legend: * p<0.05; ** p<0.01; *** p<0.001.  
(b) The estimations are performed using a sub-sample consisting of workers with either a vocational 
education or a short, medium, or long higher education. 
(c) The reference category for ethnic origin is “Other non-Western countries”. 52 








Ln(wage)  Coefficients p 
 
Std. err. 
Schooling  0.061  ***  0.001   Adequate    0.077  ***  0.001
        Overeduc    0.023  ***  0.002
        Undereduc    -0.010    0.005
Age 0.021  ***  0.002   Age 0.020  ***  0.002
Age
2/100 -0.029  ***  0.003   Age
2/100 -0.028  ***  0.003
Experience 0.029  ***  0.001   Experience 0.028  ***  0.001
Exp.
2/100 -0.054  ***  0.003   Exp.
2/100 -0.053  ***  0.003
YSM -0.008  ***  0.001   YSM -0.008  ***  0.001
YSM
2/100 0.016  ***  0.002   YSM
2/100 0.016  ***  0.002
Children (#)  -0.005    0.014   Children (#)  -0.011    0.014
Single 0.000    0.003   Single  -0.001    0.003
Foreign educ  -0.061  ***  0.005   Foreign educ  -0.051  ***  0.005
Turkey -0.051  ***  0.009   Turkey -0.051  ***  0.008
Pakistan 0.024  *  0.012   Pakistan 0.025  *  0.011
Vietnam -0.029  **  0.010   Vietnam -0.031  **  0.009
Iran 0.040  ***  0.008   Iran 0.031  ***  0.007
Iraq 0.037  ***  0.011   Iraq 0.033  **  0.010
Ex-Yugoslavia -0.015  *  0.006   Ex-Yugoslavia -0.015  *  0.006
Somalia -0.060  **  0.020   Somalia -0.056  **  0.019
Stateless -0.016    0.013   Stateless -0.017    0.012
1996 0.002    0.004   1996 0.002    0.004
1997 -0.005    0.004   1997 -0.005    0.004
1998 0.025  ***  0.004   1998 0.025  ***  0.004
1999 0.029  ***  0.004   1999 0.029  ***  0.004
2000 0.046  ***  0.004   2000 0.047  ***  0.004
2001 0.055  ***  0.004   2001 0.056  ***  0.004
2002 0.053  ***  0.004   2002 0.055  ***  0.004
Constant 3.771  ***  0.053   Constant 3.575  ***  0.052
           
           
rho 0.711      rho 0.679   
Wald chi2 (25)  6799.1      Wald chi2 (27)  7,960.0   
Prob > chi2  0.0        Prob > chi2  0.0     
Obs.   43,702        Obs.   43,702     
R2: Within  0.096        R2: Within  0.090     
      Between  0.226              Between  0.293     
      Overall  0.219              Overall  0.278     
Note: See note for Appendix Table A5. 53 
Table A7. Results of random effects wage regressions: 















Schooling  0.072  ***  0.002   Adequate    0.079 ***  0.002 
        Overeduc    0.037 ***  0.003 
        Undereduc    -0.032 ***  0.007 
Age 0.019  ***  0.003   Age 0.019 ***  0.003 
Age
2/100 -0.028  ***  0.004   Age
2/100 -0.028 ***  0.004 
Experience 0.029  ***  0.001   Experience 0.029 ***  0.001 
Exp.
2/100 -0.056  ***  0.004   Exp.
2/100 -0.055 ***  0.004 
YSM -0.004  ***  0.001   YSM -0.005 ***  0.001 
YSM
2/100 0.008  **  0.003   YSM
2/100 0.009 **  0.003 
Children (#)  -0.015    0.020   Children (#)  -0.021   0.020 
Single -0.001    0.004   Single -0.002   0.004 
Turkey -0.048  ***  0.013   Turkey -0.049 ***  0.013 
Pakistan 0.070  ***  0.018   Pakistan 0.064 ***  0.017 
Vietnam -0.029  **  0.011   Vietnam -0.032 **  0.011 
Iran 0.041  ***  0.009   Iran 0.033 ***  0.009 
Iraq 0.031    0.018   Iraq 0.029   0.017 
Ex-Yugoslavia -0.028  * 0.012   Ex-Yugoslavia -0.029 **  0.011 
Somalia -0.019    0.032   Somalia -0.022   0.031 
Stateless -0.019    0.015   Stateless -0.024   0.015 
1996 0.002    0.005   1996 0.003   0.005 
1997 -0.005    0.005   1997 -0.005   0.005 
1998 0.028  ***  0.005   1998 0.028 ***  0.005 
1999 0.036  ***  0.005   1999 0.037 ***  0.005 
2000 0.058  ***  0.005   2000 0.059 ***  0.005 
2001 0.073  ***  0.005   2001 0.074 ***  0.005 
2002 0.069  ***  0.006   2002 0.070 ***  0.006 
Constant 3.632  ***  0.074   Constant 3.526 ***  0.074 
            
            
rho 0.70      rho 0.68    
Wald chi2 (24)  4778.9      Wald chi2 (26)  5142.8    
Prob > chi2  0.0      Prob > chi2  0.0    
Obs.   23,189      Obs.   23,189    
R2: Within  0.135        R2: Within  0.132    
      Between  0.259              Between  0.295    
      Overall  0.259              Overall  0.288    
Note: See note for Appendix Table A5. 
 54 
Table A8. Results of random effects wage regressions:  














Schooling  0.043  *** 0.002   Adequate    0.072  *** 0.003
        Overeduc    0.011  *** 0.003
        Undereduc    0.019  *  0.008
Age  0.019 *** 0.004   Age  0.016 *** 0.004
Age
2/100 -0.025  *** 0.004   Age
2/100 -0.022  *** 0.004
Experience  0.028 *** 0.002   Experience  0.026 *** 0.002
Exp.
2/100 -0.040  *** 0.005   Exp.
2/100 -0.038  *** 0.005
YSM  -0.008 *** 0.001   YSM  -0.007 *** 0.001
YSM
2/100 0.003    0.004   YSM
2/100 0.002    0.003
Children (#)  -0.002    0.021   Children (#)  -0.009    0.020
Single  0.001   0.005   Single  0.000   0.005
Danish Track 1  -0.074  *  0.031   Danish Track 1  -0.067  *  0.029
Danish Track 2  -0.045  *** 0.013   Danish Track 2  -0.036  **  0.012
Danish-missing  0.015   0.009   Danish-missing  0.020 *  0.009
Danish-missing & 
arrive ≥ 1999  0.183  *  0.086
 Danish-missing  & 
arrive ≥ 1999  0.154    0.081
Turkey  -0.052 *** 0.012   Turkey  -0.047 *** 0.011
Pakistan  -0.027   0.016   Pakistan  -0.012   0.015
Vietnam  -0.039   0.025   Vietnam  -0.046   0.024
Iran  0.014   0.017   Iran  0.018   0.016
Iraq  0.048 *** 0.013   Iraq  0.036 **  0.012
Ex-Yugoslavia  -0.026 *** 0.008   Ex-Yugoslavia  -0.021 **  0.007
Somalia  -0.079 **  0.025   Somalia  -0.070 **  0.024
Stateless  -0.005   0.023   Stateless  0.004   0.021
1996  0.002   0.006   1996  0.002   0.006
1997  -0.004   0.005   1997  -0.005   0.005
1998  0.023 *** 0.005   1998  0.023 *** 0.005
1999  0.022 *** 0.005   1999  0.023 *** 0.005
2000  0.034 *** 0.006   2000  0.036 *** 0.006
2001  0.037 *** 0.006   2001  0.040 *** 0.006
2002  0.037 *** 0.006   2002  0.043 *** 0.006
Constant 4.001  *** 0.079   Constant 3.653  *** 0.078
           
           
rho  0.714       rho  0.674    
Wald chi2 (28)  1870.9        Wald chi2 (30)  2545.6     
Prob > chi2  0.0        Prob > chi2  0.0     
Obs.   20,513        Obs.   20,513     
R2: Within  0.0551        R2: Within  0.047     
      Between  0.1506              Between  0.252     
      Overall  0.1447              Overall  0.238     
Note: See note for Appendix Table A5. 
 